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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the decline and transmutation of the apprenticeship system in South 
Africa, specifically as it occurred in the metal ".nd engineering industry. It proceeds to analyse 
the most basic and influential imperatives which have driven this process. On the side of 
capital, these imperatives were the inexorable motive for a profit driven industrial organisation 
and on the side of organised labour, the imperatives to protect skills, jobs and wages. The 
existence of the one set of imperatives presupposed the need to redefine the existence of the 
other set. These contradictory imperatives have shaped the trajectory of the apprenticeship 
system in South Africa. They were contradictory because the one was an impediment on the 
untrammelled extension of the other. However, as the imperative of profit maximisation 
gradually became the predominant consideration in the relationship, it began to exert greater 
pressure on the character of the apprenticeship system. Within the apprenticeship training 
system, the imperative of profit maximization prioritised price calculation as the dominant 
consideration by which decisions and ·trajectories were chartered. 
Since the state mediated the relationship between the various economic interests in society, its 
interventions merely curtailed a more rapid consolidation of the effects of a profit driven 
industrial organisational imperative, within the apprenticeship training system. The triumph of 
the profit maximization imperative, systematically eroded the system of apprenticeship training 
in the metal and engineering industry of South Africa. An institutional inertia within the South 
African state resulted in the manifestation of erosive effects within institutions of the state 
empowered with governing and managing human resources development. This institutional 
inertia within the state was an accompaniment to the broader erosion of the apprenticeship 
training system at the workplace. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I.i The Thesis 
This thesis explores the evidence and processes which have led to the decline and 
transmutation of the apprenticeship system in South Africa. Why has the apprenticeship 
system in South Africa, as an institution, declined so dramatically over a period of about fifty 
years? Why have the skills of artisans which were once venerated by every enterprising 
industrialist no longer regarded with the same significance? This thesis tries to shed some light 
on these questions by analysing the forces at the workplace and at a broader institutional level 
which have contributed in major ways to the erosion of apprenticeship training, specifically as 
experienced in the metal and engineering trades. 
The central argument of this thesis is the following: 
A contest over the price of skilled labour between employers (buyers) and artisans 
(sellers) encouraged employers to undermine the monopoly which skilled artisans were 
perceived to hold over the supply of skilled labour. Employers therefore began to 
break this monopoly. Employers did so by reorganising the nature of work and 
undermining skilled occupations through job fragmentation and skills dilution. A 
system of industrial training was systematically eroded in order to reduce the price of 
skilled labour. This contest was fought over an extended period of time. It occurred 
in Britain under distinct circumstances. It has occurred in South Africa as well. In 
South Africa, racial divisions within the labour force have tended to cloud the issues 
which are almost exactly the same as in Britain. Not all countries have witnessed the 
same trajectory. These tensions have not destroyed the apprenticeship system in 
Nigeria or Germany. In Nigeria the masters dictate and determine the price of artisan 
labour. The antagonism between masters and artisans over the price of skilled labour 
has not reached the point where there is overt conflict between masters and artisans. 
In Germany, state intervention and regulation of apprenticeship training has prevented 
potential antagonisms between employers and skilled workers from undermining the 
apprenticeship system. 
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Two perspectives have influenced the way the study has been undertaken. The first relates to 
the international literature on industrial training and apprenticeship systems generally, which 
have served as a lense from which the broader debates on industrial training in South Africa 
have been interpreted. The international literature has also served as a beacon from which to 
signal issues which would probably arise later and become contentious in South Africa. One 
instance of this has been the gradual and systematic substitution of firm-based training, 
particularly in Britain, by institutional training (training performed at technical institutions and 
government training centres). The volume of attention given in the international literature to 
these issues has also enabled one to situate debates which appear peripheral in South Africa, 
within a broader context. 
The second perspective situates the study within a conceptual framework which addresses the 
evolution of skills within particular historical conjuntures. The entire analysis of the evolution 
of skills cannot be conceptualised without considering the central question of changes in the 
price and costs of categories of skill within the general category oflabour. It was mainly for 
this reason that Marxist analyses of the labour process were consulted, but alas, with the 
exception of Clawson (1980) and Haydu (1988), these [More (1982); Penn (1985) and Rule 
(1987)] proved to be oflittle use. Braverman (1974), in particular, proved to be deficient in 
conceptualising the evolution of skills in relation to changes in the price and costs of 
categories of skilled labour. By contrast, this issue is strongly alluded to in much of the 
literature on the economic history of capitalist industrial organisation. To overcome this 
problem, I was compelled to resort to some conceptual readaptation ['mirror-reading'] of 
Marx (1976), extending his conception of socially necessary labour to a concept I have found 
useful for this thesis, namely, that of 'technically essential skills' . Technically essential skills 
can be defined as the skills technically necessary to engage in particular forms of production 
under competitive price conditions. The concept is somewhat fluid, but is given precision and 
meaning in the contestation between the buyers and the sellers of labour skills. 
This thesis examines the erosion of the apprenticeship system in the metal and engineering 
industry of South Africa. An attempt is made to understand the reasons for this process. The 
thesis explores this question from the consolidation of apprenticeship training in the 1920s to 
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its gradual and systematic erosion, particularly in the way it manifested itself from the 1960s to 
the 1980s. 
Chapter one gives an overview of the political economy of apprenticeship training. It does 
this by drawing on the distinct legacies of apprenticeship training in three countries and shows 
how these provide models from which to understand the evolution of apprenticeship training 
in South Africa. Chapter two extends the discussion of apprenticeship training developed in 
chapter one by analysing broad themes in the history of apprenticeship training in South 
Africa. In particular chapter two demarcates the forces that led to the erosion of 
apprenticeship training in South Africa. Chapter three provides substantial empirical evidence 
on the changes in the structure of artisan and apprentice employment in the metal and 
engineering industry of South Africa between 1969 and 1992. It shows empirically the extent 
of the erosion of apprenticeship training. Chapter four explores the extent to which trade test 
results are an indicator of the erosion of apprenticeship training. Finally chapter five shows 
how many individuals with the potential for pursuing craft occupations, are excluded from 
apprenticeship training programmes because they do not meet the basic educational entry 
requirements. The chapter also advances tentative suggestions on how the apprenticeship 
system can be strengthened. 
This thesis does not discuss the effects of the introduction of modular training for apprentices. 
The reason for not doing so, is that modularised training of apprentices is only a recent 
phenomenon. Therefore the evidence to assess the success of modalarised training of 
apprentices is still in the making. 
Lii Aim of the Study 
The motivation to undertake this study was shaped by a quest to explain why the ratio of 
artisans to semi-skilled employees in the manufacturing sector was increasing during the 
period of the ' eighties, i.e. why semi-skilled employment was growing at a faster rate than 
artisan employment .. These changes were much more evident and pronounced in the metal, 
engineering and allied trades. I could not understand why in the context of the much 
publicised 'skills shortage' debate (see Chapter 2), artisans, as guardians and purveyors of 
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specific workplace skills, did not play a more dominant numerical role in manufacturing 
employment. 
From census statistics on labour, I could not understand why the numbers of artisans in a host 
of manufacturing industries had hardly increased between the late 1960s and the early 1980s. 
Moreover, I became aware of a trend which showed a gradual decline in the statutory wage 
gap that separated artisans from labourers. An ongoing curiosity was to know why these 
trends became so marked and visible at the beginning of the 1990s. Since the majority of 
artisans were drawn from a juridically privileged, protected and cacooned background, it 
seemed contradictory that the phenomenal trend in South Africa of a gradual decline in the 
statutory wage gap between labourers (black workers) and artisans (mainly white workers) 
could be possible at all. An explanation for these trends however could not be advanced only 
through an empirical analysis of phenomenal trends: there had to be deeper underlying forces 
in operation to explain this process and these could only be understood by studying the 
apprenticeship system in South Africa much more closely. 
Therefore, the thesis sets out to analyse the structural forces which have led to a shrinkage in 
traditional artisan employment and training. The structural forces identified are manifest at 
both a micro level (factory organisation) and a macro level (industries and training 
institutions). 
I.iii Theoretical Framework 
Three closely linked theoretical currents have influenced the conception 'of the issues 
elaborated in this study. The first of these draws on the literature of the sociology of work, 
particularly that done under the influence of Braverman (1974) which shows how the growth 
of large scale industrial enterprises under contemporary capitalism led to a shift in the nature 
and content of manual and clerical work. 
The second current draws on research undertaken by economists concerned with the economic 
evolution of institutions, particularly institutions responsible for fostering human resource 
development. Gertrude Williams (1963) and Kate Liepmann (1960) have been prominent 
within this area, but so too are: Casey (1986), Harbison (1973), Prais (1981 and 1995), 
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Metcalf (1985) and the HSRC/NTB (1985). A central concern with this group of writers is to 
determine which set of human resources policies is most beneficial nationally and 
internationally for a particular economy or society. 
The third current in particular is strongly influenced by studies undertaken on the economic 
history of industrial training and is concerned to show why particular training policies have 
generally been more influential at ditf erent historical junctures and why one set of training 
policies has been superceded by another. Studies which can be classified within this current 
include: Day (1980), Hall and Miller (1975) and Sheldrake and Vickerstatf (1987). 
I.iv Methodology 
The methodology used to assemble the bulk of evidence on which this thesis is based has been 
through an historical materialist analysis of literature sources. My understanding of historical 
materialism is informed by Marx's analysis of exploitation as elaborated in his book Capital. 
Marx analyses the components and changes in the techniques of exploitation from one regime 
of industrial organisation (manufacture) to another (machinofacture). This technique informs 
the way I explore the decline and transmutation of apprenticeship training in South Africa. 
Emphasis has been placed on obtaining quantifiable evidence to sustain this perspective. It has 
included: 
• Secondary sources of academic and non-academic literature; 
• Official government publications, which have included commissions, reports and gazettes; 
• Newspaper sources. 
The disparate nature of the evidence necessitated wide reading and careful synthesis. Because 
of the general dearth of academic studies of apprenticeship training in South Africa, it was 
necessary for me to become familiar with ancillary sources, such as those on human resource 
development and industrial training, in order to gain a broader conception of the role of artisan 
and industrial training generally. In addition to secondary sources, I have also drawn on 
conversations and discussions with friends in the trade union movement and with artisans to 
whom I was introduced or met during the course of this study. 
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CHAPTER ONE: MODELS OF APPRENTICESHIP TRAINING 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses changes in the system of apprenticeship training in Britain, Germany and 
Nigeria with the objective of helping us understand the changes in the system of apprenticeship 
training in South Africa. 
The form and organisation of apprenticeship training which emerged in South Africa bore a 
very close resemblance to the system of apprenticeship training which had developed up to the 
nineteenth century in Britain. Although the state in 16th century England had played a 
significant role in passing laws regulating apprentice indentureships and granting craft 
monopolies to particular craft guilds, it also divested itself from the task of regulating 
apprenticeship training. This was a prerogative which the masters exercised, particularly those 
who had established their reputations as craftsmen. The state's role in the evolution of the 
apprenticeship system was not entirely absent however. Power and decision-making was 
merely decentralised and under the control of craft institutions. 
As in South Africa, the apprenticeship system was introduced to Nigeria via the process of 
British colonial rule. In Nigeria however, the state's role in regulating apprenticeship training 
before and after independence was almost completely absent. Although the path of the 
evolution of apprenticeship training in Britain and Nigeria signifies that there are no general 
trajectories which the evolution of apprenticeship systems necessarily mirror, the fact that this 
evolution occurred under the hegemony of craft institutions, however disparate, indicates the 
operation of an apprenticeship system under a weak form of state organisation in Nigeria. 
Similar features were present in the United Kingdom and in South Africa, particularly while 
there was minimal state intervention in the regulation of apprenticeship training. But even in 
Nigeria, as Mabawonku (1979) and Oyeneye (1980) show, the provision of institutional 
training (training in training colleges and government training centres) as an alternative to firm 
based (workplace based) apprenticeship indenture has also begun to take place. This signifies 
that the state in Nigeria is beginning to play a more active role in the promotion and regulation 
of apprenticeship training. Apprentices in the informal small scale enterprise sector of Nigeria 
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are largely drawn from the poorer sector of society. It would be interesting for later studies to 
observe what effect the growth of institutional based training (which is characterised by 
greater state intervention in this sphere) will have on the process of selection. 
In Germany on the other hand, the strong institutionalisation of the apprenticeship system after 
the Second World War and the instrumental role of the state in maintaining it as well as 
broadening it to serve as a pivotal instrument in vocational education and training has imbued 
the apprenticeship system with more fundamental strengths than in either Nigeria or the United 
Kingdom. In Germany, apprenticeship training is not merely a passive agent of the market but 
central to state vocational education policy and is designed to accommodate a large segment 
of new job entrants in the labour market. In Germany, the apprenticeship system operates in 
unison with technical institutions of learning and not in opposition as appears to be the case in 
the United Kingdom. 
1.2 Contextual and Conceptual Background 
1.2.1 Industrial Training: International Evidence 
Industrial efficiency and productivity within manufacturing economies is largely dependent on 
the level of the technical and vocational training which is available to the workforce (Prais, 
1981). This applies particularly to precision industries such as the metal and engineering 
industry. The availability of technical and vocational instruction to the labour force partly 
explains why manufacturing economies such as that of Germany have been comparatively 
more successful. But the German system of technical and vocational education and skill 
training would not have been as successful had it not targeted a wide segment of the labour 
force or potential labour force. This was clearly recognised as early as 1899 by the Bulletin de 
l'enseignement. When comparing the French system of technical education with that of the 
German, the publication acknowledged aptly that 'German superiority does not lie at the level 
of higher technical education but at the level of working class instruction' (Bulletin de 
l 'enseignement technique 2 (3 June 1899), cited in Day, 1980: 151 ). More recently, 
10 
comparisons with Britain continue to suggest that economies with a better trained work-force 
are relatively more successful (Labour Research Department, 1988: 4).1 
A significant part of the technological advantage gained by the German industrial economy 
over competing economies is due to the high priority given to technical education and 
industrial training there. The existence of a comprehensive system of apprenticeship in 
Germany enables individuals to serve apprenticeships in numerous fields in the artisan trades 
as well as in industry and commerce (Williams, 1963 : 22). 'Vocational training in Germany is 
treated as the natural sequel to schooling .. . [and]. . .is legally obligatory for three years for all 
15-18 year olds not otherwise in full-time education' (Prais, 1981 : 30). Consequently, under 
one-tenth of new job entrants who directly take up full employment in the labour market after 
compulsory schooling, do so as unskilled labour (Prais, 1981 : 31 ). 
This is in sharp contrast to the situation in Britain, or in countries such as South Africa which 
have been influenced through their strong colonial ties with Britain. Here, much more 
emphasis is placed on successfully completing a primary and secondary education. School 
leaving certificates which have a strong academic orientation are generally regarded as a 
precondition for eventual employment. A large number of individuals entering the labour 
market after successfully proceeding through this process inevitably do so without having 
acquired the employable skills demanded by employers. Hence they would still be in need of 
further training after completing twelve years of schooling. Indeed, those who leave school 
before matriculating and are unable to secure an apprenticeship would almost inevitably 
remain unskilled or at best semi-skilled workers. Profiles of job seekers in the labour market 
show that this is indeed the case in South Africa (See Chapter 5). The inability of many school 
leavers to secure an apprenticeship position may be difficult to resolve without coming into 
conflict with deeply embedded conventions and entrenched modes of organisation. Mortimer 
has described a similar situation in the United Kingdom in the following terms: 
Furthermore, the Labour Research Department notes that recent studies show that the proportion of 
workers in engineering and metal working with vocational qualifications was 50% higher in France than in 
the UK' (Labour Research Department, 1988: 4). 
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' .. .it is necessary to emphasize that public discussion on education and training for 
young persons tends to be focused disproportionately on the education and training of 
the minority who study for O and A levels of the General Certificate of Education and 
who apply for entrance to universities, teacher training colleges, and other higher 
educational institutions. This is probably inevitable when those who figure most 
prominently in public discussion are themselves usually the products of the higher 
educational system and are the parents or grandparents of youngsters who are 
candidates for or participants in the new system. They are, nevertheless a minority' 
(Mortimer, 1971 : 58). 
An apprenticeship system, more so one that includes but also extends beyond the traditional 
artisan trades, would nonetheless enable individuals who do not complete formal academic 
schooling to pursue their education along technical and vocational lines. This would enable 
them to acquire a trade or learn a profession in areas of the economy where a demand for 
particular skills exists. As they can do so while earning an income, the problem of financing 
non-income generating activities is minimised. 
1.2.2 The Skills Question 
The apprenticeship system, generally, but in manual occupations, in particular, has historically 
been characterised by the standardisation of reciprocal obligations which developed between 
masters and apprentices. The masters had an obligation to train their apprentices. The 
apprentices had an obligation to learn from and obey their masters. Masters possessed a 
monopoly and control over the right to exercise particular skills and knowledge at the place of 
work. In order to acquire the right to exercise these requisite craft skills and technical 
knowledge, apprentices were required to submit obediently to the obligations of their masters 
over a specified period of indenture. Doing so successfully armed the apprentice with the 
licence to be associated and become part of a fraternity of tradesmen who developed common 
objectives to regulate and control access to particular skilled occupations. Indeed, in the 
absence of other legal and juridical regulatory mechanisms, the apprenticeship system ably 
served this function. (Similar points were raised by Rule (1987: 102) as well as Liepmann 
(1960: 14)). 
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The history of changes in apprenticeship training cannot be divorced from the general history 
of the changing labour process, from craft orientated towards fordist modes of factory 
organisation, particularly during the early part of the twentieth century. Usually, it was in 
defence of institutions such as the apprenticeship system that large segments of skilled workers 
resisted the onset of automated mass production assembly lines under fordist modes of factory 
organisation. These struggles at the workplace, as Braverman (1974), Clawson (1980) and 
Liepmann (1960) earlier showed for the United States and Britain, were contested around the 
definition of skill and its remuneration. Job tasks were changed through the fragmentation and 
dilution of skills. The fragmentation of job tasks was in the form of a division, distribution or 
compartmentalisation of job tasks and was normally introduced to enhance efficiency in 
production. Job fragmentation is an extension of Adam Smith's famous discussion of the 
benefits of the division oflabour. Job dilution on the other hand refers to the simplification 
and standardisation of job tasks. Job dilution eliminates traditional and outmoded ways of 
undertaking a task. Job fragmentation is an abrupt and direct change or division of job tasks. 
Job dilution rids job tasks of inefficient and unnecessary operations. Job dilution is a more 
gradual process than job fragmentation . Job demarcation refers to the legal classification of 
job tasks which is necessary to determine the price oflabour. Employees whose jobs are being 
diluted will endure a period in which their skills become diluted as well. There is a conceptual 
difference between job dilution and skills dilution. Job dilution refers to the changing nature 
of conceptual and operational activities at the workplace. Skills which are not utilised 
consistently will experience a gradual process of decline and dissolution. Skills dilution 
implies that the original incumbents of such skills lose the capacity to undertake job tasks as 
effectively as they did in the past. Job dilution may result in job losses or the reallocation of 
jobs to other sectors of the enterprise. The main purpose of introducing job fragmentation and 
job dilution is to increase the efficiency and productivity of the labour process, but ultimately it 
is about the cheapening of the price oflabour. 
Furthermore, Liepmann argued that the locus of skills in many industrialised branches 'has 
shifted from the shopfloor to the preparatory stages: to work done by technicians 
( draughtsmen, production, planning and development engineers), by designers and 
metallurgists, by works managers, estimating clerks, quantity surveyors and so forth. These 
are the real skilled occupations in modem industry'(Liepmann, 1960: 20). Whether one 
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agrees or disagrees with these arguments, is really a side issue. What it illustrates though are 
the shifts in the way skills can be defined and classified, particularly by parties whose interests 
are directly influenced by the outcomes of such definitions or characterisations. 
The changing nature of industrial organisation and the organisation of work often led to very 
rapid shifts in the technically essential skills component within the labour force. Since the 
definition of technically essential skills were constantly challenged and redefined by both 
workers and their employers, the classification of skills as either obsolete or technically 
essential, influenced the price of labour. Unnecessary and outdated skills had no value - no 
bargaining power at all. These became redundant, not however, without generating 
resistance. 
It was the technically essential skills which commanded a high price. Their regulation and the 
limitation of their supply was important to maintain their value. However, both the buyers of 
technically essential skills (employers), as well as those employees classified as unskilled and 
semi-skilled labour (most of whom were denied entry to jobs which might have enabled them 
to acquire and perform skilled job tasks) had a material interest in emasculating the 
classificatory aura and mystical orientation of technically essential skills. 
Throughout this thesis, it will be shown that employers attempted at every opportunity to 
deskill and reclassify skilled job categories as semi-skilled or unskilled. This was done either 
through job fragmentation or job dilution, both of which enabled semi-skilled or unskilled 
labour to perform skilled jobs at lower wage rates. Essentially, this was done because 
employers had a material interest in re-negotiating the price of skilled labour. Semi-skilled and 
unskilled labour had a material interest in performing work of this nature and replacing the 
gate-keepers who had previously occupied entry points to a whole range of skilled jobs 
through regulatory institutions such as the apprenticeship system. This point was cogently 
captured by Haydu when he wrote: 
'And whereas deskilling undermined craft monopolies, it promised less skilled workers 
better pay and status' .(Haydu, 1988: 12) 
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In opposition to these eroding forces, organised skilled workers attempted to regulate the 
entry to skilled occupations. They did so in a number of different ways, some of which 
involved age restrictions, limitations on the ratio of apprentices to artisans or closing the trade 
to non-craft workers by systematic exclusion ( See Liepmann, 1960: 156). To a very 
significant extent, the history of work under the system of factory organisation was about the 
issue of the perennial definition and re-definition of skill. 
Where they failed to stem the tide of new configurations in skill classifications, the possessors 
and regulators of skilled occupations, as a rearguard and defensive measure, attempted 
through artisan trade unions to forge new tactical alliances with agents in a similar 
predicament. Similarly, the cementing of tactical relations occurred between the ' old guard' 
and a 'new guard' of agents on the brink of controlling emerging technically essential skills. 
The thesis will show that the pervasiveness of racial ideologies in South Africa prevented an 
early formation of such alliances, particularly between white artisan trade unions and the 
emerging black trade unions. 
1.3 Apprenticeship Training in Britain 
1.3.1 Antinomies of Artisan Training and Educational Reform in Britain 
The apprenticeship system in Britain has often been castigated for consolidating and 
preserving a monopoly over craft skills - a monopoly controlled by a specific institutionalised 
segment of the working population (Hall & Miller, 1975; Lee, 1979; Williams, 1963). In my 
opinion, this craft exclusivity has bred an intensely defensive craft chauvinism which has 
prevented the apprenticeship system from operating effectively or efficiently as a system of 
industrial training. Similarly, it can be argued that these practices have been inserted and 
reproduced, to some extent, on a similar scale, in countries which were historically colonised 
and dominated by Britain, including South Africa. 
Legally apprenticeship in Britain emerged with the organisation of guilds in the sixteenth 
century. The Statute of Artificers was the first legislative instrument covering the acquisition 
of skills in Britain. However, it did so within an extremely repressive legal framework. 
Passed in 1563 it extended guild regulations throughout Britain, but at the same time placed 
preconditions and prohibitions on the training of apprentices. Within the weaving industry for 
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instance, it prohibited entry to 'any who had not undergone a seven-year apprenticeship, and 
limited apprenticeship to the sons of gentlemen and freeholders owning more land than three 
pounds per annum. It thus closed the industry on paper at least, to three quarters of the rural 
population' (C.Hill, cited in K.Hall and I.Miller, 1975: 31). Hall and Miller contend that the 
Statute of Artificers gave monopolistic skill rights to the de facto possessors of such rights. 
It is evident that there were similarities between the craft guilds which developed in the 
medieval period and in the period of the transition to capitalism on the one hand and trade 
unions under the consolidation of capitalism on the other. Both were concerned with wage 
regulation and price control, particularly in the way that these issues affected its members. 
Concerning the differences between craft guilds and trade unions, Lipson notes that the craft 
guilds regulated different grades of producers: the manual worker, the middleman and the 
master, whereas the 'modem trade union is a combination of manual workers' (Lipson, 1937: 
390) 
Perhaps the yeoman guilds most closely resembled craft unionism, because both sets of 
institutions discouraged competition between its members and also attempted to regulate 
prices and wages to the benefit of its members. However, guilds were unable to develop the 
organisational longevity of trade unions because as potential entrepreneurs, the journeymen 
were unable to establish a stable and permanent organisation which merged the interests of the 
successful journeymen with the less successful. Lipson advanced the following explanation for 
this organisational failure : 
'To some extent their failure is accounted for by the repressive policy adopted towards 
them both by the local and central government. A more important reason is that, while 
it was becoming increasingly difficult for the hired workers as a body to achieve 
independence and mastership, yet the way was always open to the more enterprising 
among them to do so. So long as it was possible for a certain number of journeymen 
to become masters, a permanent and efficient association was out of the question. The 
leaders of the journeymen with greater intelligence and capacity than their fellows 
would constantly be absorbed into the higher grades of the fellowship' (Lipson, 1937: 
410) 
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But before craft unions could emerge with any semblance of an association to the medieval 
guilds, it was necessary for the guilds to experience the turmoil of the domestic system. Within 
the domestic system, the corporatist umbilical cord between masters and journeymen was 
unambiguously severed, transforming the masters into capitalists and the journeymen into 
subcontractors and skilled labourers. Only then, and only after the journeymen combined into 
workers associations and trade unions, could these organisational entities claim a vague 
lineage with the antecedent guild organisations. 
The decline of craft guilds and their eventual replacement by craft unions meant that such 
onerous guild laws could hardly disappear at once, particularly in a country which did not 
experience the abrupt turmoil's of bourgeois-democratic revolution; in a country which 
adopted and discarded legislation with great difficulty if not with intense anxiety, and 
consistently prided itself with the gradual evolution of its legal and political institutions.2 For 
the apprentice, the apprenticeship tradition was a test of endurance and commitment and 
ultimately represented a conversion for the apprentice to similar convictions as the master. 
This tradition appeared to be 'designed to bind the apprentice to his master and to restrict the 
master in admission of others to his field of mastery' (Maclure, 1979: 44). Its existence 
allowed the craft unions to masquerade as patrons but to continue as prisoners of tradition, 
intent on maintaining its male preserve, enforcing age restrictions on training and defending its 
sacrosanct conventions on the length of training. In appearance this seemed to be no different 
to the regulation of a closed-shop with more restrictive entry qualifications. The maintenance 
of apprenticeships along these lines has been used to preserve a privileged market position for 
specific groups of workers (Penn, 1985 : 130). Even where apprentices acquired extensive 
technical skills as a result of a relatively long apprenticeship, the absence of compulsory 
qualifying tests meant that there might have been many instances where very little technical 
skills were acquired by apprentices. Advances in technological development led to the 
obsolescence of time honoured skills in traditional occupations; it compelled the craft unions 
to defend these portals of privilege as employers attempted to exploit the reality of the 
situation by trying to enforce job dilution and job fragmentation. 
2 These sentiments were constantly expressed in contemporary and later writings on British institutions. 
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Despite these features, apprenticeship still remains the most important instrument of industrial 
training, especially in the more recent period. In Britain during 1974, 24 per cent of new 
entrants into employment were admitted via apprenticeship. This accounted for 43 per cent of 
all young male entrants but only 6 per cent of all young female entrants, most of whom 
entered the hairdressing trade (Maclure, 1979: 44). The United States remains an exception 
since apprenticeship training covers a very small proportion of total training in the economy, 
constituting only 1/300 of the total labour force. Nonetheless, this figure represented 2.26 per 
cent of craft and related workers and amounted to just over a quarter million in 1976 
(Stromsdorfer, 1981 : 46). 
During the 'sixties, Gertrude Williams provided a catalogue of evidence on the inadequacies of 
the British apprenticeship system. At the time, the duration of apprenticeship training was five 
years. Indenture started at the age of sixteen and ended at twenty-one, after which 'the 
apprentice is considered a skilled worker and becomes entitled to a full adult rate' (Williams, 
1963 : 4). It could be reduced to four years for those who continued their education at a 
technical college after the legal school leaving age. Nonetheless a skills shortage still prevailed 
in the British economy. 
Contributing to part of this skills shortage was the reluctance of small and medium sized firms 
to take on apprentices (Williams, 1963 : 5). An explanation for this was provided by Williams. 
Apprentices were perceived to work for only four days in the week for five days pay; the fifth 
being reserved for day-release instruction at a technical institution. But it was acknowledged 
that since many of the small firms concentrated on and specialised in producing a narrow range 
of products or ancillary services - many of them for large firms - they appeared less and less 
capable of providing apprentices with a fully fledged and comprehensive training package. 
The dislocation to the work schedule of the small firm which occurred when apprentices were 
away was a further reason advanced, one which also appeared to be an ideological construct 
that small and medium sized firms used since day release was not compulsory and no more 
than thirty per cent got it. This reluctance to train apprentices coexisted with a strong 
preference to poach them with higher wages when they qualified as artisans. These forces 
only exacerbated the serious skill crisis experienced in the British economy at the time. It was 
also used to show that the provision of skilled labour to the economy could no longer depend 
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on the apprenticeship system. Apprenticeship training was seen as an unreliable agent of skills 
provts1on. 
Exacerbating the skills crisis further was the prevalence of a five year training period and the 
application of restrictive age limits on new apprentices. The five year training period remained 
problematic and was difficult to reconcile with the requirements of mastering every skill. 
Technological advances had already been slowly diluting the job content of many traditional 
skills. This process was cogently described in the 'seventies by Hall and Miller who noted: 
'That skills are changing is in any event an observable fact~ for example, modem 
machine tools for screw-thread rolling or gear-cutting do not require the intricate 
operating skills which the rudimentary machines of twenty or more years needed. Or 
again, today's garage mechanic replaces faulty parts with factory-made or factory 
reconditioned spares - which is a far cry from the skills possessed by the pre-war 
mechanic who had to be able to repair faulty parts, to 'blue and scrape' main and 
big-end bearings and so on, and the mechanic of yesteryear has to a large extent 
become a mere fitter in the true sense of that word. Again, few carpenters and joiners 
employed on building sites are now required to make window-frames or staircases, and 
doors are almost universally factory-made by semi-skilled labour. So skills 
requirements are changing, yet training time changes only slowly and often only after 
considerable effort on the part of the industrial training boards' (Hall and Miller, 1975: 
48). 
The continuous dilution and transformation of skills originally believed to be well entrenched 
in the employment hierarchy by those wishing to acquire craft skills, represented a serious 
structural inadequacy within the craft tradition. It meant that no craft occupation was 
guaranteed to exist into perpetuity. It implied that the protection enjoyed as a result of the 
control and regulation of skills could now be undermined through job fragmentation and job 
dilution. Even traditionally secure craft occupations were not immune from some form of 
fragmentation or dilution which occurred by means of a gradual simplification and 
standardisation of complex and difficult tasks. The reason for the dilution and fragmentation 
of skills, as I showed in the introduction was that through changes in the organisation of work, 
new skills could be assembled more cheaply to perform similar functions. 
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Restrictive age limits imposed barriers on individuals who had missed the chance of doing an 
apprenticeship at the specified age and by their late teens or early twenties were considered 
too old. Since union rules prevented their indenture, they were 'condemned to remain 
semi-skilled workers for the remainder of their working lives' (Williams, 1963: 6). Exceptions 
to this ruling were seldom made - admittance was only made for 'dilutees' but according to 
Williams only after prolonged negotiations and with great reluctance, since the divisions 
between 'skilled' and 'unskilled' remained rigidly intact in Britain (Williams, 1963 : 6) 
These intensely regulated divisions featured more prominently according to Williams (1963) in 
the larger and more industrial enterprises, despite skill being performed and defined along a 
narrower range of operations in these enterprises. In contrast, within smaller enterprises, a 
broader performance of tasks was required from a smaller selection of individuals. On this 
basis Williams (1963) pondered whether individuals who underwent a long costly training for 
a narrower but more specialised range of skills ever exercised them in reality. The rigid lines 
of demarcation between job types tended to reduce job mobility which she perceived as a 
wastage of skills. 
In Britain, the barriers which complicated apprenticeship training contrasted sharply with a 
lack of an effective national apprenticeship training programme. Quality remained a stark 
deficiency and so did mechanisms for the proper instruction, testing and evaluation of 
apprentices. 
According to Williams: 
'There is no supervision of training by any outside authority, and as there is no test at 
the end it is impossible to know how many apprentices reach a minimum standard of 
competence. A young man who finishes his five-year training period automatically 
attains skilled worker status. His employer may have kept him on one or two types of 
job throughout the whole time; he may never have attended a technical class or have 
been either too idle or stupid to learn if he had; he may have picked up slovenly 
methods from those with whom he came into contact etc. etc. Whatever his 
experience he is considered skilled after five years' (Williams, 1963 : 7) 
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Little provision was made for actual on-the-job instruction. Apprentices were expected to 
learn by watching others. Provision for instruction was made through the system of 
day-release at a technical college or institution, but since it was not compulsory it was 
estimated that only 30 per cent of apprentices obtained it during the 'sixties.3 The absence of 
compulsory trade tests generally made it difficult to evaluate the quality of training obtained by 
apprentices. Enquiries undertaken by the Crowther Report {1959) showed that of the craft 
students who entered the City and Guild examinations only a small proportion were successful 
in reaching the intermediate standard and the proportion passing the final standard was 
insignificant (Williams, 1963: 8). 
On the other hand, Williams showed that the apprenticeship system in Germany had been more 
coherently structured. Since it aimed to meet national requirements, the training which was 
provided in Germany adhered to detailed specifications for each occupation. Emphasis was 
placed on achieving a uniform standard on the skills taught and external evaluation of the 
content and supervision of training was performed constantly. Finally, a nationally recognised 
trade test with a uniform standard of competence was established (Williams, 1963 : 18). 
Germany remains a very credential conscious society. These features of the social structure 
contributed partially to the radically distinct industrial achievements registered between Britain 
and Germany. 
Whereas industrial training in Germany was fashioned to facilitate large-scale application and 
utilisation of skills, it also contained a more generalist orientation. Apprenticeship training in 
Britain remained inflexible and restrictive - too many restrictive lines of demarcation between 
trades coupled with institutional taboos and exclusionary practices plagued the system. 
Training was strongly dependent on obtaining an apprenticeship position. Apprenticeship 
positions were not automatically guaranteed but was in tum dictated by the immediate needs 
and means of employers; in essence by the conditions of the market. 
3 Even here sharp variations were recorded. Attendance at day release was high in certain branches of 
engineering but practically unknown in other fields. 
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1.3.2 Reforming Apprenticeship Training in Britain 
After the end of the Second World War the refonn of apprenticeship in Britain received more 
government attention. 'Attempts have been made to loosen the rigidity of the system and to 
increase its adaptability to modem conditions' (Maclure, 1979: 48). Loosening its rigidity 
could only be achieved by curtailing if not destroying the power of the craft unions. 
Increasing its adaptability meant regulating the entire system from above if necessary without 
the co-operation of the unions. But within the British context it was almost impossible to 
resolve this issue through compromise - it needed an outright victor to be successful. Success 
meant reorganising the system from above as it was understood by the government and 
employers. To attempt to do so at the time, however, would have been politically unwise as 
the craft unions remained powerful and were not without allies in the organised labour 
movement. 
The promulgation of the 1964 Industrial Training Act in Britain enabled the state to impose 
more control over industrial training. It did not threaten the apprenticeship system directly, 
but subtly under the guise of addressing and responding to the serious skills shortage 
perennially confronting the British economy - which was indeed real - it made provision for 
the expansion of company and industry based training schemes. The finance for this was 
derived from payroll levies imposed on companies within a given industry. These were paid 
into a fund from which grants to companies which undertook training as stipulated by the 
Industrial Training Board were made. It led to the development of modularised training which 
occurred in conjunction with colleges of higher education (Maclure, 1979: 48). The Industrial 
Training Act also enabled government training centres to extend and expand their realm of 
activities. In this way, institutionalised training slowly began to encroach on a terrain which 
traditional apprenticeships or ancillary schemes had previously covered. 
Mass production techniques increasingly caused the traditional fonns of apprenticeship to 
become obsolete. This led to an expansion in the growth of institutionally based technical 
education. 4 Despite the bureaucratic obstacles imposed on a diluted entry into the craft 
4 In this thesis, institutionally based training refers to the training performed in private or government 
training centres or technical colleges. Institutionally based training is most often carried out on a full-time 
basis over a variable time period (a week, a month or a quarter) . Institutionally based training is normally 
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establishment, apprenticeship training did make provision for upgrading from unskilled to 
semi-skilled status. 'Upgrading was the practice of promoting (normally to semi-skilled tasks) 
labourers, or other semi-skilled workers, who had gained some knowledge of the trade by 
working in association with skilled operatives' (J.Sheldrake and S.Vickerstaff, 1987: 5). 
Institutional training, like that being performed at the government training centres, was 
beginning to replace craft regulated upgrading schemes in importance. It was also executed 
on a far greater scale. 
Significant doubts, if not criticisms have been expressed about the quality of training 
undertaken at the Government Training Centres. For instance, evidence accumulated by Hall 
and Miller during the 'seventies, shows that a significant portion of trainees at Government 
Training Centres did not necessarily use the skills acquired there after re-entering the labour 
market (Hall and Miller, 1975: 91). Two-thirds (63 .6%) of these trainees did however enter 
the labour market, immediately after leaving the training centres. Nonetheless for the period 
of the seventies, a sizeable proportion (36.4%) did not necessarily obtain employment 
immediately after leaving the Government Training Centres. Their sample yielded the 
following profile in table 1. 
Table 1: Length of Unemployment and Extent of Skills Usage in First Job after leaving 
G tT .. C overnmen ramm: entre 
Period Unemployed Using Skill Not Using Skill Total 
% % % 
None 70.9 21.6 63 .6 
Less than 5 Weeks 17.7 16.2 17.4 
5-26 Weeks 10.5 48.6 15 .9 
More than 26 Weeks 0.9 13 .5 2.7 
Still Unemployed - - 0.4 
Total N=220 37 258 
%= 100 100 100 
Source: Hall and Miller, 1975, p.91, table 8.1. 
The sample showed that the longer trainees remained unemployed, the less likely were they to 
use the skills acquired at the Government Training Centres when they did eventually enter the 
labour market. These criticisms were reinforced in the 'eighties with evidence showing that 
contrasted with training which occurs at the place of work of trainees. In this thesis, work based training is 
also referred to as firm-based training. 
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not only was the quality of training at Government Training Centres generally poor, with more 
training being undertaken at the basic and preparatory levels and being of limited application in 
later working life, but it was difficult for trainees who had qualified to obtain employment in 
jobs for which they had undergone training (See Sheldrake and Vickerstaff, 1987: 22). Often, 
existing training programmes, especially public financed training programmes were not 
designed to keep pace with new technological and structural developments which were 
continuously emerging at the point of production. Structural and technological developments 
were already slowly beginning to redefine traditional craft boundaries, a trend which also 
precipitated the replacement of traditional craft skills with that of the multi-skilled or flexible 
craft worker. The emergence of flexibility in the workplace - which is also a global 
phenomenon - is also encouraging the standardisation of craft qualifications (See Sheldrake 
and Vickerstaff, 1987: 61-62). Not only will the reform of the apprenticeship system as it 
prevails in Britain increase the flexible entry into previously craft controlled jobs but the 
standardisation of qualifications required to do the job will make it easier as Sheldrake and 
Vickerstaff correctly argue 'for people to retrain at various points in their working lives to 
reach different skill levels' (Sheldrake and Vickerstaff, 1987: 61-62). 
More broadly, problems experienced with regard to industrial training were also a product of 
the completely inadequate and poorly co-ordinated nature of industrial training in Britain. 
According to Sheldrake and Vickerstaff this is rooted in British ambivalence to training which 
at the public policy level has resulted in the implementation of ad hoc measures and 
programmes that has solved very little but fuelled more contradictions and tensions in the 
system. They write: 
'British ambivalence to training remained firmly rooted. In the period 1964-1979 
attempts to reform the training system foundered on historically entrenched barriers to 
change. Employers remained unconvinced of their obligation to contribute to the 
wider skills base of the economy and maintained their short-term planning horizons. 
Trade unions continued to equate training primarily with apprenticeship and see their 
major aim as the maintenance of craft traditions and "skilled" status. The distinction 
between "education" and "training" continued and initiatives from the education lobby 
did not successfully penetrate the training policy community. The ethos of voluntarism 
had been transposed into the new policy initiatives, state intervention was 
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circumscribed by governments' acceptance of the basic tenet that training was 
industry's business. Unable or unwilling to devise measures to alter training practice at 
the level of the firm public policy took refuge in ad hoc special measures and 
programmes' (Sheldrake and Vickerstaff, 1987: 57-58). 
It is clear that the attempt to reorganise industrial training after the war, actually accelerated 
the erosion of apprenticeship training in Britain. To understand why this occurred it is 
important to link industrial training to the entire educational structure in Britain, since 
industrial training only constitutes one facet of this broad issue. Industrial education and 
training probably constitutes the lowest rung in the status hierarchy played by education in the 
United Kingdom. Even unions have been led to believe that the vocational nature of education 
which would assist their members in the short term is a long term liability; and have therefore 
given ardent support - with the encouragement of teachers .:. for the adoption of a more 
general education. 
Vocational education has been perceived to be narrow and more limiting and also lacks the 
status associated with a non-vocational general education. Maclure has been vociferously 
critical of this mentality which he argues has promoted, a peculiar bias into higher education in 
Britain, particularly in the universities and polytechnics where a greater emphasis is placed on 
the study of economics, law, sociology, business and commerce at the expense of production 
engineering. This has been mirrored and reproduced in other spheres of the educational 
system as well . Maclure attributes this to: 
' ... an increasingly irrelevant academic tradition, which gives pure science and research 
a higher status than applied science, technology, and production and which is 
orientated away from productive industry and toward the professions, the civil service, 
and the social services. This tradition is related to a history of elite education, once 
geared to the needs of a governing class and an overseas empire, which has never 
come to terms with the demands of manufacturing industry. Instead, it has enabled its 
educated elite to avoid manufacturing industry throughout their working lives and 
thereby enhance their own status' (Maclure, 1979: 91). 
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In fact, Maclure is mistaken to assume that this is an entirely British phenomenon. In Britain it 
may assume a specific character, but it is quite apparent that it is more pronounced where 
vested interests in the educational arena have gained control over the educational system and 
have used it as a vehicle to promote its own particular interests under the guise of the national 
interest. Similar perversions have emerged in developing countries including South Africa, 
and fashioning policies to challenge this process has remained a perplexing and very sensitive 
issue. 
1.4 Training Costs: Institutional Versus Firm-Based Training 
Studies by economists which show that institutionally-based training is more cost effective 
than firm-based training have elicited ambivalent responses, since these have been contrasted 
with those studies which support the reverse. The debate typifies the approach economists 
tend to use, whereby categorical reasons are advanced - with the aid of cost-benefit analyses -
to explain why one method of training is more appropriate than the other. But cost efficiency 
is not the only criterion for evaluating training schemes. It may be more constructive to 
combine the two methods (i.e. institutionally-based training and firm-based training) so that 
they complement rather than compete with each other. 
Ryan has constructed a model to depict theoretically the costs of job or in-service training 
(Ryan, 1980: 334). This approach is also followed by Metcalf(l985 : 77-78). The model 
assumes that both the employer and the trainee may bear costs for job training. The cost the 
trainee bears is equivalent to the additional rewards that could be obtained by doing something 
different such as obtaining a job where wages are higher and the period of job training shorter. 
This cost also includes the spell the trainee spent in formal training at a company school or 
similar institution. 'The firm bears a cost for the training to the extent that it pays the trainee 
more than the value of his or her net contribution to output - net, that is, of the value of any 
incremental usage of materials, equipment etc., involved in the use of the trainee rather than 
experienced workers' (Ryan, 1980: 334-335). The training cost of the firm is measured over 
the period in which the value of the trainee was less than the remuneration and costs of 
keeping him or her employed in the firm. This could also be characterised as the learning 
period in which the trainee's contribution to output increases gradually if not uniformly. 
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Comparative evidence on the costs and benefits of both institutional and firm-based training 
has been brought to our attention by Metcalf (Metcalf, 1985). Metcalf cites a host of 
international evidence to support his argument that the expansion of institutionally based 
training is more cost efficient and therefore more sensible than firm-based training. On the 
other hand this evidence also shows 'that in Brazil and Peru short courses have a bigger 
pay-off than long courses of training' (Metcalf, 1985: 44). 
Informal firm-based training tends to be more cost effective than that undertaken in industrial 
institutes and vocational secondary schools: 
' ... training in industrial institutes and vocational secondary schools is less cost effective 
than more informal firm based training, at least in Kenya, India and Israel' (Metcalf, 
1985: 44). 
It is also suggested that institutionally-based vocational training is substitutable for formal 
schooling: 
' ... the payoff to quasi-institutional vocational training in South America is higher for 
those who have only completed primary school than for those who have completed 
secondary school. This suggests that extra formal schooling may be substitutable for 
formal institutional vocational training' (Metcalf, 1985: 44). 
While the findings of these studies might be correct, one example showing a contradictory 
pattern is from a World Bank study which compared the productive returns between 
institutionally based and firm based training in Malaysia. It identified a number of differences 
between the two systems. In my view it also highlights the danger of being overtly categorical 
on the basis of studies undertaken under different circumstances. The study showed that 
institutionally trained apprentices earned 12 per cent more than company trained apprentices, a 
factor which Metcalflargely attributes to their 'additional productive capability over company 
workers' (Metcalf, 1985: 25). Yet company trainees were more productive than institutional 
trainees during the training period, despite the fact that the training costs for institutional 
training were higher than those for company based training. Because firms did not directly 
bear the costs of institutional training, except through a levy and grant system, it was claimed 
that this route gave firms a larger return. However, seen in relation to the overall resources 
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expanded on training and the productive output of trainees, firm based training is more 
effective than institutionally based training. 
What is generally true, is that institutionally trained workers have obtained more impressive 
credentials which are accepted or used to justify higher earnings than firm or company trained 
workers. The same study also showed that it was more difficult for firms to retain the services 
of institutionally trained graduates since they sought to increase their earnings by seeking 
employment elsewhere. 
On the other hand, an exclusive reliance on firm based training may create other problems. 
Firm based training provides its recipients with skills and techniques that are directly 
translatable and applicable to productive and work related activities; skills that do not become 
obsolete the moment they are acquired. Applied orientation makes learning for those 
individuals who dropped out of the educational system more tolerable and interesting. 
However, as firms are often ill-equipped to provide theoretical instruction, it may be necessary 
to complement on-the-job training with a segment of institutional based training. By 
developing a more holistic emphasis - one which nonetheless discriminates in favour of firm 
based training and does not allow it to be superseded completely by institutional training -
where a healthy balance is maintained between the two, a more vibrant system of technical 
education may evolve. Harbison (1973) argues thus, especially for developing countries 
where exorbitant expectations about the benefits of formal education were and still are often 
nurtured. 
'Many developing countries expect too much from formal education. They want it to 
produce skills which are learned much better on the job. They hope that it will 
produce managers, administrators, and statesmen, without realising that such persons 
really acquire most of their skills in the crucible of experience on the job. As a rule the 
strength of formal education does not lie in training manual craftsmen, factory 
workers, or modem farmers . Here employing institutions and employment oriented 
non-formal training have a decided advantage' (Harbison, 1973 : 128). 
Harbison has provided an important motivation for the retention of firm-based or on-the-job 
training of which apprenticeship schemes is merely one case. 
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1.5 Informal Apprenticeship in Nigeria 
The absence of detailed statistics generally makes it more difficult to assess the impact of 
apprenticeships in Africa. The relatively secondary contribution which manufacturing 
industries - traditionally associated elsewhere with more vibrant apprenticeship schemes -
make towards national output appears to be a debilitating factor for formal apprenticeships on 
the African continent. Even in Nigeria, which after South Africa has the largest manufacturing 
sector in sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 1992), the maintenance and regulation of 
apprenticeships appear to function without formal state intervention. Institutional and legal 
requirements which establish the boundaries of apprenticeship training, as in South Africa, are 
largely absent. Analysing this issue is made more difficult in the way economic data is 
published. In Nigeria for instance, only firms which employ ten or more individuals are 
included in official statistics. It is therefore not possible to quantify the number of small 
enterprises which employ fewer than ten workers, many of whom are apprentices, or indeed 
the total number of workers employed in such enterprises. 
This necessitates greater reliance on estimates obtained from researchers and academics. Two 
such studies on which I have drawn were undertaken in Western Nigeria at the end of the 
'seventies. The first by Mabawonku covers apprenticeship training in modern small-scale 
industries in the towns ofOyo, Ijebu-Ode and Aiyepe (Mabawonku, 1979). The second by 
Oyeneye examines apprenticeship training in small-scale enterprises in both the modern and 
traditional industries within the towns of Oyo and Ede (Oyeneye, 1980). 
Traditional or indigenous crafts and industries are those which existed in Nigeria long before 
British colonisation. It includes industries such as blacksmithing, weaving, pottery and 
calabash carving. Modern industries were introduced to Nigeria through colonial conquest 
and through Nigeria's gravitation to the world market. Examples of modern industries in the 
context of small scale enterprises are tailoring, carpentry, auto-repair, radio and television 
repairing and photography. According to Mabawonku 'apprenticeship in the more traditional 
industries is always restricted to only members of the household and is often subject to many 
taboos and rituals' (Mabawonku, 1979: 4). On the other hand, he argues that apprenticeship is 
less personalised in the modern industries and reflects more accurately the labour market 
29 
situation and returns to labour in the subsector (Mabawonku, 1979: 4). Because 
apprenticeships are practised in such an assortment of crafts, arts and occupations, 
apprenticeship training in Nigeria is very extensive. In the 'sixties it was estimated that there 
were around two million apprentices in Nigeria (See Oyeneye, 1980: 70). In both the modem 
small-scale industries and the informal sector of Nigeria, the apprenticeship system is entirely 
informal. 
1.5.1 Apprenticeships in Modern Small-scale Industries 
As is the case in many other African countries, young men in Nigeria enter the labour market 
at a relatively young age. Since statutes which prohibit child labour do not exist in Nigeria, 
many youths move to the cities in search of wage employment after completing their primary 
education. A large proportion of apprentices have parents who are in low-income 
occupations. Because they are often unable to afford the high cost of educating their children, 
they consciously 'send them to seek their fortune in the apprenticeship system where costs of 
training are lower' (Mabawonku, 1979: 15). 
Most newly indentured apprentices are relatively young, with 70 per cent still in their teens 
with an average age of 14 years, while 80 per cent completed primary school education. The 
average level of education obtained was five years (Mabawonku, 1979: 11). For most youths 
with limited job experience, an apprenticeship in Nigeria remains one of the few entry points 
into the labour market. In Mabawonku's survey: 
' ... nearly 90 per cent of the apprentices had no previous job experiences and about 60 
per cent never sought wage employment, but instead moved from formal education to 
apprentice training. Of those who sought employment prior to training, about 29 per 
cent remained unemployed for 1 to 12 months. The relative unattractiveness of 
farming as an occupation to youths is shown [by the fact] that only 3 per cent of the 
apprentices were ever engaged in farming' (Mabawonku, 1979: 15). 
It is the norm for young apprentices to spend more time in training than older ones. The 
parents, guardians or sponsors of the apprentice are required to pay the master an apprentice 
fee . This sum can be paid over a defined period but must be paid before the apprentice 
graduates. The master is also required to pay an allowance to the apprentice. It can be given 
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on a daily or weekly basis and is used to cover basic requirements of the apprentice such as 
midday meals and sometimes transportation (Mabawonku, 1979: 23). 
Conventionally, once recruited within a firm the apprentice is not regarded as a normal worker 
with fixed hours and is therefore required to participate actively in the proprietor's household 
activities as well. This requires that the apprentice perform activities or chores unrelated to 
job specific training (Mabawonku, 1979: 18). Indenture agreements are mostly unwritten. In 
some cases however, written agreements are prepared and cover issues such as the length of 
the training period and the amount of fees to be paid (Mabawonku, 1979: 19). These 
agreements are not underwritten through the normal judicial process however, as is the case in 
many European countries where agreements are prepared through the courts or in the 
presence oflawyers. Consequently, 'disputes over the fulfilment of obligations are settled 
between the parties concerned without recourse to legal and judicial authorities' (Mabawonku, 
1979: 22). Violations of agreements such as the non-payment of apprentice fees is 
constrained by the power masters wield, since they can refuse performing the freedom 
ceremony to errant apprentices or their financial sponsors who renege on pecuniary 
obligations. Failure to perform the freedom ceremony would mean that the apprentice would 
not be awarded with a certificate or any evidence of having received training. As informal as 
these credentials are, not being accredited with them would prevent the apprentice being 
recognised as an artisan in the Western Nigerian context. In reality without 'papers', the 
qualifying apprentice would lose a whole range of benefits as well as opportunities which 
artisans theoretically enjoy, such as higher wages or the right to hire apprentices after starting 
a business. 
1.5.2 Institutional Training 
Since the 'fifties, when it first started, institutional training has had a more prominent influence 
in the training of craftsmen. Between 1959 and 1963, five trade centres, one of which was a 
women's centre were established at different locations in Western Nigeria. Each centre 
offered specialised courses in many trades. Between 1962 and 1971, enrolment in these 
centres increased from 854 to 1853 . Admission requirements to these centres are quite strict: 
candidates have to be between the age of fifteen and eighteen with a secondary school leaving 
certificate. In addition, they are required to pass an entrance examination to secure admission. 
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Training lasts for three years and although students are required to buy books and work 
clothes, the cost of the programme is heavily subsidised by the state (Mabawonku, 1979: 28). 
1.5.3 The Informal Sector 
Oyeneye's sample of informal sector apprenticeships includes firms in modem as well as 
traditional trades. 5 Apprentices in the indigenous or traditional crafts are generally younger 
than those in modem crafts. The reason for this phenomenon is explained by the fact that 
'apprentices in the indigenous crafts were more likely to start learning in childhood, while 
those in the imported crafts often complete their primary education before they start an 
apprenticeship' (Oyeneye, 1980: 71-72). Oyeneye's survey showed that apprentices in the 
indigenous crafts have a lower level of formal schooling than those in the imported modem 
crafts: 
While half of the apprentices in these crafts had no schooling or only a few years in 
primary school, only one ninth of those in the imported crafts were in a similar 
situation' (Oyeneye, 1980: 72). 
The need for greater numeracy for measurement, tool handling and so forth in the modem 
crafts, encourages masters to be more discerning in their selection of apprentices, favouring 
those with a higher educational standard. This was especially the case in radio and television 
repairing. None of the apprentices in this craft had failed the primary school leaving certificate 
examination, while one third had gone beyond this level (Oyeneye, 1980: 73). 
Regarding the class origins of apprentices, Oyeneye's study substantiates similar conclusions in 
Mabawonku's, namely that apprentices were generally drawn from the poorer strata of society. 
5 The different definitions of the informal sector used by Mabawonku and Oyeneye as well as the types of firms 
included in their SUIVeys give rise to some degree of ambiguity. Mabawonku informs us that the survey in his 
study is drawn from small-scale enterprises in the modem crafts and trades of the economy. Oyeneye's SUIVey 
includes small-scale enterprises in modem and traditional crafts and trades of the informal sector. However, 
just by comparing Oyeneye's sample with Mabawonku's, it is quite clear that a large proportion of firms in 
Mabawonku's sample are in fact informal sector enterprises in modem crafts and trades and not merely 
small-scale enterprises. It gives the incorrect impression that they are located almost exclusively in the formal 
sector, whereas the reverse prevails. 
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Using the occupation and education of the fathers of apprentices as an index of the social 
origins of apprentices, Oyeneye's survey showed that only 2 per cent of the apprentices had 
fathers who were in clerical or other white-collar jobs. The greater proportion had fathers 
who were fanners (34%), skilled workers (36%) and traders (14%) (Oyeneye, 1980: 74). The 
decision to enter trades where an apprenticeship is offered is dictated by perfectly rational 
calculations of future rewards, calculations derived on the basis of what could be achieved 
currently had they possessed a particular combination of skills. 
'Though less desirable, many of the apprentices, like their masters, have taken to the 
infonnal sector apprenticeship system because of the hope that they will be better off 
than those in the lower echelons of the fonnal sector or those engaged in labouring or 
farming. For example, some of the apprentices see skill acquisition as providing more 
security with better long-tenn financial rewards than being engaged as house servants. 
Furthennore, many of them felt that once they were qualified and were able to set up 
workshops, they would become masters of themselves, control their time and take on 
their own apprentices' (Oyeneye, 1980: 76). 
Whether the calculations yield anticipated effects or materialise as planned, is an altogether 
different question. Due to the prohibitive costs, which is also dependent on the nature of the 
craft, it is extremely difficult for newly qualified journeymen to start a business immediately. 
Even experienced journeymen who wish to set up in business experience difficulty in raising 
finance through nonnal credit channels such as government agencies and commercial banks 
and therefore have to build up a strong personal savings base before starting on their own. 
For newly qualified artisans Gourneymen) heavy reliance is therefore placed, often with 
expectation, on family members as a likely source of capital (Oyeneye, 1980: 78). 
1.6 Apprenticeship Training in Germany 
Vocational training in Gennany is highly organised, being separately co-ordinated by a 
separate Ministry of Vocational Training. The type and quality of training is also dictated by 
labour market requirements. In Gennany, finns are usually separated through membership to 
either an industry chamber [Industriekammer] or a craft chamber or guild [handwerk guild], to 
which they are required to belong by law. Generally, it is the smaller finns with a median size 
in manufacturing of just under ten employees who belong to the craft chamber. Usually, 
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because the owners of these firms had previously qualified by examination for the masters 
certificate of the trade guild, these firms are also entitled to train apprentices in a particular 
trade. Larger firms are affiliated to the industry chamber to which they are also required to 
pay an annual subscription (See Prais, 1981: 29-30). 
Using the 1967 census as a basis, Prais showed that although the craft sector (handwerk 
sector) accounted for only about a tenth of all employees in manufacturing, its contribution to 
training was more significant, since between 16 and 42 per cent of trainees, depending on the 
category and scope of activity, were found in this sector. In comparison to Germany, the 
extent of vocational training in smaller firms in Britain is almost non-existent. Small firms in 
Britain generally rely on the training provided by large firms for their supply of craftsmen 
(Prais, 1981 ). However, the training provided in the small craft sector in Germany has often 
been criticised for providing 'too narrow a range of technical experience' (Prais, 1981: 31 ). 
Yet, the contact with wider business responsibilities which training in small firms provide, 
enables many trainees to move to larger firms, while others remain in the small-firm sector, 
until an appropriate opportunity eventually arises for them to set up their own craft enterprises 
(Prais, 1981 ). 
The evidence assembled by Prais implies that the small scale sector in Germany has had a more 
significant impact on the training of artisans, a trend which was not evident in the United 
Kingdom. Within the context of individual training, Prais' argument gives a rationality for the 
existence of small firms, such that, relative to their contribution to gross economic output, 
small firms contribute more to training than larger firms . However, trends observed during the 
'eighties rudely contradict Prais' postulates. In fact, a study by Casey (1986) reveals 
something diametrically contrary to that identified by Prais in Germany. 
During the 'seventies large industrial and commercial enterprises in the FRG invested a larger 
per capita amount on apprentice training than did smaller firms or artisan enterprises. 
Furthermore, in smaller enterprises, training is usually given by the foreman or owner of the 
firm at the workshop, 'whereas in larger enterprises special training workshops are established' 
(Casey, 1986: 67). This phenomenon leads Casey to two interlinked propositions on the 
political economy of apprentice training. In the first of these, since small or artisan enterprises 
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are more inclined to derive an immediate return from apprentices, and since the quality and 
costs of training are lower than those in large firms, young apprentices in small firms tend to 
be hired as cheaper substitutes for skilled adult labour. Empirically, confirmation of the 
substitution of cheaper apprentice labour for more expensive artisan labour is demonstrated by 
the stark differences in the extent of training between small-firm sectors and large-firm sectors. 
'Thus, it has been calculated that in 1970 [in Germany] firms with less than 50 employees 
provided some 57 per cent of all apprentice places but only 30 per cent of all jobs in the 
economy' (Casey, 1968: 68). 
The validity of this proposition is confirmed by empirical studies which also demonstrate the 
existence of an additional and closely related proposition. Empirical studies, in Germany in 
particular show that business cycles exert a profound impact on the degree of apprentice 
training in both large and small firms . In relation to the business cycle, large firms tend to vary 
their volume of apprentice training pro-cyclically, whereas small enterprises vary their training 
volume counter-cyclically (Casey, 1986: 69). This means that large firms expand the number 
of apprentices in training during the upswing of the business cycle, whereas small firms expand 
their intake of apprentices during the downswing. Logically, small firms can only do so 
effectively if they substitute young apprentice labour for older artisan labour and utilise the 
savings in wages to offset the losses in output which would necessarily be sustained by 
employing younger, inexperienced but cheaper labour substitutes. With more empirical data 
we could test whether these propositions have any explanatory significance for South Africa, 
especially in the light of the large numerical decline of apprentices which has occurred since 
1979 in some sectors. 
1. 7 The Significance of the Three Systems of Apprenticeship to South Africa 
This thesis explores the evidence and processes which have led to the decline and 
transmutation of the apprenticeship system. Despite regulating access points to skilled 
occupations at the workplace in South Africa for over a century, the role of the apprenticeship 
system in South Africa is not as prominent as it was in the past. International evidence shows 
that the apprenticeship system in countries such as Britain, which was a model adopted in 
most British Dominions or British Protectorates, the decline in the system of craft orientated 
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apprenticeship training has been equally pervasive. In fact, what has occurred in South Africa 
merely mirrors the trends which have occurred in Britain. 
Even comparatively late starters such as Nigeria, whose apprenticeship system is still largely 
confined to craft occupations in pre-industrial enterprises ( e.g. calabash making, wood-carving 
etc.) has experienced similar tensions between the independent and self-regulated preservation 
of apprenticeship traditions, regulations and occupations on the one hand and some form of 
state intervention which has tended to threaten and disrupt the established craft hierarchies on 
the other. This tension has been manifest through the provision of craft skills to service the 
human resource needs of modem occupations (e.g. craftsmen in mechanics and electronics) 
and state intervention to provide skills training for economic development through institutional 
training at government training centres and tertiary institutions ( e.g. technicians in mechanics 
and electronics). 
In terms of its overall trajectory, South Africa's system of apprenticeship training occupies an 
intermediate stage between the apprenticeship system of Britain and Nigeria. It is neither 
completely institutionalised as in Britain nor is it completely craft regulated as in Nigeria. A 
crucial difference however is that ideological and institutional discrimination on the basis of 
racial stereotypes in South Africa have largely excluded black employees from artisan 
positions and occupations for the most part of the twentieth century. In a comparative sense, 
the extent to which change and restructuring in British economic development has occurred 
has been closely monitored in the academic, practitioner and popular media literature. One 
example of this is to compare the extent to which contributors in the South African 
management journal Human Resources Management are aware of management systems that 
have been introduced in the United Kingdom and the consequences of these. One can 
therefore conclude that both employers and administrators responsible for contributing to a 
stable human resources climate in South Africa will be influenced to some extent in the way 
these issues have been dealt with in the United Kingdom, principally because it remains the 
easiest shorthand from which to draw upon. 
Compared to Nigeria, apprenticeship training in South Africa has been thoroughly 
institutionalised and the entire system of apprenticeship training has been regulated by various 
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legislative provisions and Acts of Parliament. {These will be discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 2). The various legislative provisions gave the craft workers power, autonomy and 
protection to guard access to craft occupations. This was achieved through various craft trade 
unions. Contrary to Britain, the reduction in the power of the craft unions in South Africa 
combined with the state's policy of publically funded tertiary educational institutions was less 
rapid. Nonetheless, considering the very close historical affinity between the apprenticeship 
system of the two countries, a great deal of what has been implemented in Britain tends to 
resonate as a concrete experiment in South Africa at a slightly later juncture. 
The system of apprenticeship training in Germany on the other hand differs in fundamental 
ways from that in Britain, as Williams (1962) and Prais (1981) aptly showed. Most 
importantly, the state's interest in apprenticeship and vocational training in Germany was not 
to compete and undermine the activities of the traditional craft organisations but to establish a 
common partnership between the craft organisations and the state. Consequently, the 
apprenticeship system in Germany has been much stronger and coherent than in either Britain 
or South Africa and has shown itself to be more adaptable to changes over time. The De 
Villiers Commission on Technical and Vocational Education was particularly influenced by the 
system of apprenticeship and vocational training in Germany and in fact the basic architecture 
of the COTT system, which will be discussed in the following chapter, emerged out of this 
influence. However, in South Africa, COTT represented a limited partnership between the 
state, employers organisations and labour organisations. It was a limited partnership because 
it effectively excluded the vast majority of employees from its ambit on racial grounds. It is 
this theme which will be elaborated in more detail in chapter two, where the contradictions in 
apprenticeship training will be explored in greater depth. 
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CHAPTER TWO: A BRIEF HISTORY OF APPRENTICESHIP TRAINING IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
2.1 Introduction 
Historically, since the industrial revolution, the prime and most affordable way in which 
technical and vocational training was open to a large segment of individuals wishing to 
become skilled workers was by indenture through a system of apprenticeship. This was 
shaped by the history and craft legacy of trades in which a skill or occupation could be 
acquired. It applied predominantly, to male individuals within a certain age limit prepared to 
abide by a clear set of rules. The system of apprenticeship through indenture was imported to 
South Africa with the early craft and industrial workers who arrived from Britain during the 
mining revolution in the latter part of the nineteenth century (Union of South Africa, 193 5: 
para. 691). The need for a regular supply of skilled workers, many of whom emigrated to 
South Africa from Britain, became evident to industry and state at an early stage. Few 
apprentices were employed outside the mining industry and the state railways however (Union 
of South Africa, 193 5: para. 691). 
This chapter traces the evolution of apprenticeship training in South Africa, from its 
consolidation in the Apprenticeship Act of 1922 until the beginning of the 1990s when 
modularised training for apprentices was introduced. It does this, firstly, by providing an 
overview of the legislation which impacted on apprenticeship training. Secondly, it documents 
the attempts to institutionalise apprenticeship training after the Second World War through the 
Central Organisation of Technical Training. Thirdly, it explores the way in which a complex 
set of forces mediated by the interests of employers and white artisan unions, as well as the 
engagement of the apartheid state, from the late 1950s systematically served to erode and 
undermine the legislative and institutional fabric of apprenticeship training which had been 
established with the promulgation of the Training of Artisans Act (1951). It shows how the 
aims and intentions of a whole battery oflegislation was unable to halt the erosion of 
apprenticeship training. 
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2.2 Legislation 
The first comprehensive attempt to legislate and regulate apprenticeship in South Africa was 
contained in the Apprenticeship Act of 1922. Prior to this, apprenticeship training was 
governed by a host of disparate legislation, chief of which was the Regulation of Wages, 
Apprentices and Improvers Act (1918). The 1918 Act empowered a wage board to regulate 
the ratio of apprentices to skilled workers. However, only in the commercial distributive trade 
and in the clothing industry, both on the Witwatersrand, were ratios prescribed (Union of 
South Africa, 1935: para.692). Provisions in the Apprenticeship Act of 1922 enabled 
employers in designated trades to employ minors for an indefinite period, provided they 'did 
not serve on probation for more than six months with any one employer; at the end of that 
period, a formal contract had to be entered into' (Kooy, 1952: 6). Kooy records that this 
system was highly abused by employers who discharged their apprentices just before the 
completion of the six months probationary period, merely re-engaging them soon after 'in 
order to avoid payment on a higher scale of wages or to avoid being bound by a contract' 
(Kooy, 1952:6). Kooy remarks: 
'This process was repeated again and again, and it was often found that prospective 
apprentices worked for years in one or more designated trades without ever being 
indentured' (Kooy, 1952: 6; Union of South Africa, 1935: para. 740). 
This subsequently led to the Apprenticeship Act being amended in 1924 and again in 1930. 
But, the evidence of the Industrial Commission in 193 5 showed that minors were still being 
dismissed at the end of their probationary periods only to be re-employed in other occupations 
(Kooy, 1952: 6). Paraphrasing official inquiries into these malpractices, de Broize (1977) 
notes: 
'Alternately the employer would dismiss his employee before he is scheduled to 
complete his apprenticeship. Because of the absence of a signed contract the employee 
would have no evidence of having done his apprenticeship. In some cases it might be 
necessary to repeat another term of apprenticeship with another employer' ( de Broize, 
1977: 93). 
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The amended Act was replaced by the new Apprenticeship Act 37 of 1944 which according to 
Kraak was passed 'primarily to co-ordinate the training of thousands of young white workers 
employed in the ammunitions' and manufacturing industry during the war years' (Kraak, 1988: 
215). The severe shortage of skilled labour experienced during the post-war boom led to the 
promulgation of the 1950 Training of Artisans Act which 'allowed for the training of adult 
workers (those over the apprenticeship age of21) to meet these shortages' (Kraak, 1988: 
215). The Apprenticeship Act 37 of 1944 was in tum replaced by the Apprenticeship Act 46 
of 1963 where extensive changes to the apprenticeship system were made (Thompson & 
Benjamin, 1991). By the end of the 'seventies, a multitude of laws covered apprenticeship 
training. These included the Training of Artisans Act 38 of 1951, the Black Building Workers 
Act 27 of 1951, the Black Employees In-Service Training Act 86 of 1976 and the In-Service 
Training Act 95 of 1979 (Thompson & Benjamin, 1991 ). The Black Building Workers Act of 
1951 'prohibited the employment of blacks on skilled work in [white] urban areas without 
ministerial permission' (Thompson & Benjamin, 1991: Cl-2 n.4). The Wiehahn Commission 
recommended the consolidation of these laws but also argued that African workers be 
indentured as apprentices throughout South Africa, including white urban areas, although it 
preserved racially separate state training facilities. 
The recommendations of the Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions also prompted the enactment 
of the Manpower Training Act 56 of 1981. This Act did not cater exclusively for apprentice 
training but covered the promotion and training of employees in all sectors of the economy. 
The conditions specified in the Act relating to apprentices included a minimum age 
requirement of 16 years and a minimum qualification of a standard seven certificate. It also set 
a prescribed period ofindenture, (depending on the industry) of up to four years (Kraak, 
1988: 215). The Manpower Training Act 56 of 1981 was amended further by the Manpower 
Training Amendment Act 39 of 1990. The new Act significantly reduced the state's role in 
training and enabled industry to play a greater role in training than previously. It also replaced 
the previous time-based system of training for artisans which had been the hallmark of 
apprenticeship training in South Africa with a system of modularized competency-based 
training. With a modular system, apprentices will now be required to pass regular tests before 
they can proceed with further theoretical training (Thompson and Benjamin, 1991 ). 
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With the growth of secondary industrialization in South Africa the apprenticeship system 
played an indispensable part in the training of new artisans. Although the promulgation of the 
Black Building Workers Act in 1951 dealt a severe blow to the possibility of Africans being 
indentured as artisans, Kooy indicates that even before this occurred, white artisan unions 
attempted to preserve racial exclusion within their ranks and strenuously resisted the training 
of black artisans (Kooy, 1952: 9-12). Whites undergoing artisanal training increased rapidly 
during the period preceding the Second World War nearly doubling from 6103 in 1933 to 
11583 in 1939 (Davies, 1979b: 257). This trend continued uninterruptedly during and 
immediately after the war. According to Davies 'the number of whites undergoing 
apprenticeship training rose from 15671 in 1944 to 21513 in 1948 - an increase of 3 7 per cent' 
(Davies, 1979: 310). 
2.3 The Organisation of Technical Training in South Africa 
One of the first systematic attempts to address the shortage of skilled labour, especially artisan 
labour in South Africa was undertaken with the establishment of the Central Organisation of 
Technical Training (COTT), in 1940 which operated under the Director-General of War 
Supplies (HSRC/NTB, 1985: 16). Fashioned as a short-term measure, its initial purpose was 
to address the large-scale shortage of skilled technicians being experienced at the time in the 
Defence Force. According to Kooy, another intention was to 'supply industry with technicians 
needed for post-war industrial expansion' (Kooy, 1952: 77). Potential trainees were required 
to sign a service contract, 'undertaking to serve, if so required, for four years from the date of 
completion of their training or for the duration of hostilities, whichever was the shorter, either 
in a military or a non-military capacity' (Kooy, 1952: 79). 
COTT provided intensive technical training courses in the following fields : Fitting (16 weeks), 
machine tool operating (12 weeks), gas and electric welding (8 weeks), blacksmithing and 
springsmithing (12 weeks), instrument repairing (12 weeks), electrical repairing (12 weeks) 
and metal working (12 weeks). At the end of each course, trainees were examined by head 
office inspectors and classified according to performance (Kooy, 1952: 79-80). Thus, through 
centralised planning and large scale state intervention, a large bulk of individuals obtained 
technical training during the Second World War. The HSRC/NTB Investigation into the 
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Training of Artisans in South Africa states that by November 1943 some 22 417 persons had 
been trained under this scheme. In 1945 however, 
'the accent was changed to the training of ex-servicemen for civilian re-employment. 
This system continued to function under the Union Education Department until 1948' 
(HSRC/NTB, 1985: 16). 
At the end of the war in 1945, it was envisaged that COTT would continue functioning 
through the training of selected ex-volunteers but, as Kooy (1952: 81) indicates, 'gradual 
assimilation of COTT by the Technical Colleges was to be the essential aim of the post-war 
organisation', and the intensive nature of the training programme was maintained. Initially a 
scheme for the training of 5000 ex-volunteers was instituted by the Government. Applicants 
were required to be white males between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five with a standard 
six or corresponding certificate. As an incentive, trainees 'were to be provided with tools and 
overalls at the beginning of their course and were entitled to retain these tools after the 
completion of their period of training' (Kooy, 1952: 81). Intensive training was provided to 
bricklayers, painters and plasterers (13 weeks), bricklayer-plasterer, carpenter and plumber (17 
weeks) and electrician (20 weeks) . The syllabus for the courses was drawn up by COTT and 
the National Trade Testing Board. The first part of the training had to be undertaken in the 
COTT workshops and thereafter continued in various private workshops under the 
supervision of qualified inspectors (Kooy, 1952: 82-83). The theoretical training was 
undertaken at local technical colleges. 
On successfully completing this intensive course, trainees were placed with suitable employers 
for a period of further training not exceeding three years. After the first year, the trainee was 
entitled to sit for a trade test and 'on passing ( or on completion of the full period of three 
years' apprenticeship), was deemed to have reached artisan status' (Kooy, 1952: 83). 
It was part of the state's plan as Kooy states, for there to be a gradual integration and 
disappearance of COTT into Technical Colleges. Kooy notes that the contribution made to 
the training of artisans was acknowledged by both employers and unions who wanted to see a 
continuation of the programme. 
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'The reason given for this was that South Africa, as a young country, faced a period of 
industrial expansion comparable, in its need for skilled workers, to the state of 
emergency experienced during the war. COTT, with its system of intensive training, 
seemed the most suitable way to remedy the inevitable shortage of artisans prevalent 
under these circumstances, and should therefore be adopted in all trades in which a 
period of apprenticeship was deemed necessary' (Kooy, 1952: 84). 
Since an adequate supply of artisans could not entirely be fulfilled through immigration, these 
bodies favoured the continuation of the scheme through COTT. COTT functioned under the 
Union Education Department until 1948. In 1951 the Training of Artisans Act was passed. 
Among other things the 'Act provided for a one year of full-time intensive institutional training 
followed by three years of training with an employer approved by the Minister of Labour' 
(HSRC/NTB, 1985 : 17) With the passage of the Training of Artisans Act of 1951, COTT 
served as a training centre. In 1952, it was converted to a trade test centre. On 1 April 1982 
COTT was transferred from the Department of National Education to the jurisdiction of the 
Department of Manpower, and has since served as the only recognised trade test centre for 
designated trades (NTB, 1991). 
2.4 The Viljoen Commission 
A very important official commission of inquiry established to explore policy relating to the 
protection of industries in South Africa also drew attention to the problems which were 
generally associated with the system of apprenticeship training. Through its chairman, it 
became known as the Viljoen Commission and submitted its findings in 1958 (Union of South 
Africa, 1958). 
The Viljoen Commission attempted to address the question of the shortage of white 
apprentices in the manufacturing industry by recommending experimentation with a policy of 
immigration and decentralisation. The framework adopted by the Commission was effectively 
to perfect the system of grand apartheid. In some instances it recommended steps which 
would later create explosive tensions within the entire institutional fabric of the apprenticeship 
training system as it existed then in South Africa. Some of the shortcomings which the Viljoen 
Commission associated with the apprenticeship system were to resonate in future commissions 
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of enquiry and official investigations, particularly that completed by the Human Sciences 
Research Council and the National Training Board in 1985 (Union of South Africa, 1958: 
para. 270). 
The Viljoen Commission argued that there were a number of reasons for the general apathy 
exhibited by white youths against entering into apprenticeship contracts (Union of South 
Africa, 1958: para. 252). First, statutory wages for apprentices were too low. Second, 
employers in the motor and metal industries tended to demand higher qualifications from 
prospective apprentices. Third, argued the Commission, a large number of apprenticeship 
positions in the building and furniture trades were perceived to be passing into the hands of 
' non-Europeans' , particularly in the coastal provinces which created a reluctance for white 
youths to be indentured as apprentices in those sectors. The requirement of compulsory 
attendance at technical classes as well as a preference for white collar employment were 
further reasons for a disinclination of white youths to enter apprenticeship training 
programmes. 
It is interesting to note that the system of day release of apprentices first developed in the 
mining industry was initially on a voluntary basis so that apprentices could attend technical 
classes. As an incentive, an arrangement was made to refund school fees on the satisfactory 
completion of classes (Solomon, 1967: 46). When the system of technical training for 
apprentices was incorporated into the Apprenticeship Act of 1922, it was adopted almost in its 
entirety from the practice in the mining industry. 
As a means to alleviate the problems it documented, the Viljoen Commission recommended 
that the Government ' adopt a positive and effective immigration policy, with the appropriate 
financial assistance of the State' (Union of South Africa, 1958: para. 279 and 280), so that 
25 000 European or white immigrants could immigrate to South Africa annually. As a 
corollary to the accommodation of industries which were more dependent on cheap African 
labour, the Commission proposed the decentralisation and favourable location of these 
industries, which included textiles and allied industries. These industries were largely 
dependent on 'Native employees', and because they also faced competition from industries in 
low wage countries, it was presumed imperative that the racial composition of the work force 
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remained unchanged. The Commission envisaged that the dilution and fragmentation of jobs 
performed by 'non-European employees' in areas closer to the reserves, would alleviate the 
shortage of skilled labour. 'This could be facilitated by the break down of skilled processes 
into semi-skilled functions in order to achieve the maximum utilisation of the available labour 
force' (Union of South Africa, 1958: para. 281). A key assumption of the Viljoen 
Commission was that decentralisation was to be built largely on a semi-skilled cheap black 
labour force engaged in fragmented jobs using diluted skills. 
An interesting interpretation of the effect of the Apprenticeship Act was advanced by Hutt in 
1964. According to Hutt, while the Apprenticeship Act of 1922 was designed to assist white 
youths to acquire industrial skills, it had the opposite effect in practice. By extending the 
ambit to civilised labour policies which enabled better remunerated employment to be reserved 
for white employees, it also 'weakened the incentive for self improvement among them' (Hutt, 
1964: 74). While training facilities were developed at technical colleges and attendance at 
these were made compulsory for apprentices, it was not compulsory for a qualifying 
examination to be passed in order to qualify as an artisan. Hutt lamented this wastage where 
the majority of apprentices never used the expensive facilities at their disposal, merely being 
satisfied with becoming journeymen by the passage of time. An amendment to the 
Apprenticeship Act in 1963 delayed the period of qualification of apprentices who did not pass 
the trade test examination by one year, during which they were paid 70 per cent of the 
journeyman's wage (Hutt, 1964: 75).6 Hutt noted that the Minister of Labour at the time 
described the wage sanctions of this policy as tough (Hutt, 1964: 75). 
2.5 The 'Sixties and 'Seventies 
Throughout the 'sixties and 'seventies elements within the more liberal fractions of big business 
were engaged in a persistent, organised and vitriolic ideological battle with white artisan 
unions the majority of which were ardent defenders of the system of job reservation. An array 
of interesting and convincing arguments were advanced to demonstrate the irrationality of 
these practices. Chief of these was that unless the more severe forms of job reservation were 
abolished immediately, the consequent skills shortage which could develop, and indeed was 
6 S.M.C.Harmese (1980: 30) notes that it was compulsory for all apprentices intending to be admitted as 
journeymen to sit for the artisan trade test for all industries, within four years of being indentured. 
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apparent in some instances, would constitute a severe obstacle to the country's rate of 
economic growth. Job vacancies which could not be filled by whites further confirmed the 
contention of employers that a skills shortage did indeed exist. This ideological battle was 
fought as employers attempted to pressure the reactionary white artisan unions to open up 
certain categories of reserved jobs to black labour. It inadvertently put these representatives 
of business at the public forefront in the struggle to end job reservation and take advantage of 
black labour by using it more effectively. In response to this challenge, according to Webster, 
the artisan unions granted employers limited exemptions at Industrial Councils to employ 
non-union labour (i.e. black labour). Webster notes that it was exceedingly difficult for unions 
to question the 'perennial prediction of skills shortage', since it had by 1970 become a pillar of 
conventional wisdom (Webster, 1985: 157). 
Throughout this period a fervent and virtually uninterrupted process had been set in motion, 
instituting more and more vigorous forms of job fragmentation at the point of production. 
Cullinan was blunt in describing the process: 
'Such fragmentation made previously white jobs available to blacks on a less skilled 
level. The fact that blacks could be paid lower wages for performing these fragmented 
jobs lowered the costs of the wage bill. Fragmentation was thus seen as the most 
suitable strategy to adopt in order to get around the institutionalised exclusion of the 
black labour force from the categories of labour reserved for whites' (Cullinan, 1980: 
30). 
Job fragmentation and labour substitution were being instituted along a wide spectrum of 
occupations where cost benefits were obtainable. For instance, Webster remarks that in the 
late 'seventies the average wages of lower skilled operatives and labourers were lower than 
apprentice rates, except first year apprentice rates (Webster, 1985: 162). Despite the levies 
and grants paid to individual employers to employ and train apprentices, it was still more 
economical for employers to employ cheap black labour instead of apprentices. As Charles 
Meth put it: 
'Apprentices' wages cannot be driven down low enough to make them competitive 
with the lower paid blacks' (Meth, 1979: 86, cited in Webster, 1985: 162). 
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The irony of the process as Webster points out, was that while the uneconomic nature of 
apprenticeship training encouraged employers to bypass the apprenticeships for cheaper 
non-unionised black labour, they (employers) still 'argued that a skill shortage existed' 
(Webster, 1985: 162). 
A skilled shortage existed precisely because job reservation largely limited the training of 
artisans to whites. Because blacks could not be trained as artisans, it was more difficult for 
white artisans who had the potential to enter managerial and supervisory positions to be 
released from normal artisanal functions (SAIRR, 1966: 209). The skilled shortage was 
shaped through the prerogatives and restrictions of employers to use potentially available 
sources of labour. It was artificially constructed, but it had visible manifestations. 
By the early 'sixties at least, it was generally acknowledged within many business enterprises 
and within particular state institutions that the shortage of skilled labour was serious enough 
to compel revisions in capital expenditure programmes. The Survey of Race Relations for 
1964 contained the following information: 
'According to a Press report [ Star, 4 April 1964] because of the shortage of skilled 
workers the Government has asked local authorities to curtail capital expenditure 
programmes. Various industries have been similarly affected : Mr H.F. Oppenheimer, 
Chairman of African Explosives and Chemical Industries, said in April [Rand Daily 
Mail, 6 April 1964], "Our company has been actively considering projects to be 
undertaken during the next few years at the cost ofR90 million. Some of these 
projects will quite certainly have to be dropped or postponed because there will not be 
the men available to carry them out" . Some of the collieries in Natal have had to close 
sections furthest away from the haulage systems because of a shortage of fitters and 
electricians' (SAIRR, 1965 : 23 5-236). 
One of the measures employers devised to cope with the situation of a skill shortage involved 
the increase of overtime working for skilled and unskilled labour alike, in some cases to the 
limit of human endurance (SAIRR, 1975: 257). Other measures were the process of job 
fragmentation and dilution and where the law exempted it, labour substitution. 
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The leadership of the white artisan trade unions was clearly aware of the strategy employers 
had embarked upon: using the skills shortage to advance job fragmentation and renege on the 
obligation to train additional apprentices. As Ben Nicoholson, general secretary of the South 
African Electrical Workers Association expressed it: 
'The apprentices are there for the taking. They want to use the shortage of artisans to 
force the trade unions into accepting the fragmentation of skill - cheap labour that can 
be exploited' (Ben Nicolson, quoted in Rand Daily Mail 22/1/80 and cited in Cullinan, 
1980: 103 and Webster, 1985: 158). 
The leadership of the Iron Moulders Society perceived it as a psychological war between craft 
workers and employers: 
'In the foundry industry, the employers granted 100 certificates of apprenticeship in the 
last ten years. Such a small increase in the intake of apprentices is difficult to 
understand at a time of expansion in the foundry industry. We believe that the 
argument of a shortage of skilled labour is the kind of psychological warfare waged by 
the employers against all workers to frighten them and make them work harder if they 
want their jobs' (Bloomkort Harris, cited in Webster, 1985: 163). 
Furthermore, as noted by Van der Walt of the South African Boilermakers, Iron and Steel 
Workers, Shipbuilders and Welders Society, employers could bypass training white 
apprentices by training Africans under the Black In-Service Training Act of 1976 which also 
reimbursed them for all training costs incurred. 
' ... under the Black In-Service Training Act of 1976 the employers prefer training 
blacks because of the tax concession which reimburses the employer for all training 
costs - including equipment, salaries and materials. This was particularly advantageous 
where the need for the rapid training of various jobs was concerned. Previously, the 
employer would have had to train an apprentice for three to four years, at considerable 
cost, in order for that task to be done. A cheaper black worker with three months 
intensive ( effectively cost free) training could perform a specific coded welding task, 
that an experienced white apprentice would merely encounter as an aspect of his three 
year training' (Van der Walt, cited in Webster, 1985 : 167). 
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Because employers constantly alerted friend and foe alike to the existence of a skills shortage, 
the state was compelled to take some sort of remedial action. But since the artisan unions 
which sat on the apprenticeship boards vetoed the notion of African and in general black 
artisan training, the state passed the Black In-Service Training Act in 1976. The act appeased 
both employers and racist artisan unions alike, enabling employers to train black workers in 
semi-skilled and operator occupations just below the artisan level, while it preserved the basic 
bastions and power of the white reactionary artisan unions by leaving the Apprenticeship Act 
intact. However, it unintentionally gave employers space to begin to undermine the 
apprenticeship system through the fragmentation and dilution of jobs. In 1976, eight public 
training centres were built by the government at a cost of between R250 000 and R300 000 
each, to train black employees. As an incentive to encourage employers to send their workers 
to these centres, the government enabled employers to recoup a large bulk of their expenses 
through tax deductions. One source noted that 'employers can claim 98 cents out of every one 
rand spent on the training of workers at these centres by way of tax concessions' (Star 
12/4/77). 
The sentiments expressed by Van der Walt in an interview with Cullinan was symptomatic of 
the agonies and frustrations white craft unions experienced with major features in the 
regulation of apprenticeships. 
'There is absolutely nothing wrong with the Apprenticeship System per se in this 
country. It is in fact a very good system, and of high calibre ... The problem lies with 
the regulation of it. Now, while we feel that the apprentice is entitled to receive the 
kind of training that will equip him to do his specialised trade well, ... the training 
schedules are not always adhered to in the training of apprentices. The number of 
apprentices I know who have spent three years drilling millions of holes into little bits 
of metal, day after day .... what kind of skill training is that? ... On the other hand our 
apprentices are cheated at the other extreme .... where they acquire specialised skills 
very rapidly in some trades and are employed to do a fragmented part of the artisan's 
job at apprentice rates of pay. Obviously this is no good to us. We cannot have our 
artisans undercut, our apprentices underpaid and the state of craft training undermined' 
(Van der Walt, cited in Cullinan, 1980: 72-73 .) 
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While the mentoring syndrome in apprenticeship training, informally referred to as the 'sit-by-
Nellie' system, was open to abuse by employers who failed to train apprentices adequately and 
according to the agreed conditions laid down in the contract of apprenticeship, new forces 
stemming from the workplace were systematically undermining the influence of apprenticeship 
training and beginning to threaten the preserve of craft exclusion and privilege which was 
associated with the apprenticeship system. Despite the political influence they were able to 
wield as a skilled segment of the labour force, they had no effective solutions to the structural 
traumas they faced. 
Van der Walt claimed that the regulation machinery was hopelessly understaffed. In most 
provinces there were too few inspection officers to police and monitor the adherence to 
prescribed training schemes in the Apprenticeship Act. According to Van der Walt the entire 
Metal and Engineering Industry of the Transvaal only had two inspectors at the time of the 
interview, while the Orange Free State had none. 'Besides which', Van der Merwe remarked 
to Cullinan, 'everyone knows when they're coming. They phone us months before. The 
employers then put the apprentices into prescribed training until he's gone. Meanwhile, when 
the inspector asks the poor bloke who's been drilling holes for months, whether he's happy, he 
grins from ear to ear because for the past two months he's been doing interesting work' (Cited 
in Cullinan, 1980: 73). Log books into which apprentices were supposed to record the details 
of work performed every day were more often not filled in; but then they were seldom 
demanded by inspectors. 
Despite the fact that these problems had already begun to plague the apprenticeship system, 
the government continued with its perennial back-patting or arrogant outbursts whenever 
confronted by critics. In 1974, in response to an opposition party spokesperson in the House 
of Assembly criticising the government's racially exclusive policy on vocational and 
apprenticeship training, the Minister of Labour responded in the following way: 
'Are we doing enough to train people? I think one can never do enough to train 
people, but that we are doing a great deal within our means, is most definitely the 
position. If one considers that we have 31 apprenticeship committees and that we have 
the National Apprenticeship Board in which the employers and the trade unions are 
represented .... then it is a sign that we are not asleep' (SAIRR, 1975 : 260). 
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Many employers criticised the trade unions as being the last obstacle to the maintenance of 
exclusion at the workplace and for being responsible for perpetuating the skill shortage. 
However, a large bulk of employers themselves did not respond as quickly to state provisions 
that allowed other forms of workplace or in-service training to be conducted. Armed with the 
1976 Black In-Service Training Act, employers were given the liberty to train as many African 
employees, virtually at no extra cost to themselves at government training centres. Since 
many employers were too small to provide training themselves, the rationale was that they 
would make use of the facilities at government training centres and similar institutions. 
Nonetheless employers tended to underutilise the facilities at these government training 
centres. State officials remained concerned at the lackadaisical approach to training most 
employers seemed to have adopted (Argus 10/5/80; Star 20/8/80; Financial Mail 20/3/81 ). 
Yet, employers could make taxable claims for wages paid to apprentices, including class fees 
and the costs of on-the-job practical training undertaken by apprentices, but which were borne 
by employers (HSRCINTB, 1985: 196). Roly Clark, the vice-chairman of Chamdor7 , a 
training centre run by industry with government financial assistance, complained that many 
firms were unclear what their training needs were. He said: 
'We go to them and ask them what kind of courses they want us to run, and their 
answer is: "Well, what kind of courses have you got"' (Sunday Times, Business Times 
4/4/76). 
Although difficult to measure, the problem of some firms poaching trained workers from other 
firms was equally severe (Star 12/4/77). 'Most of the poaching occurs at the expense of 
public sector organisations and the large monopoly corporations who train substantial numbers 
of artisans. It is thus not surprising that these organisations have also experienced the most 
severe skill shortages. This poaching of skilled labour is accentuated by the problem of high 
turnover rates amongst artisans - estimated to be 32% per annum. High apprentice and artisan 
turnover rates simply induce a higher level of poaching and a vicious circle is thus set in 
motion' (Kraak, 1988: 255). 
1 Chamdor was one of three such training centres opened in 197 5. The Sunday Times Business Times of 
4/4/1976 noted that: 'Government provides the initial building costs and basic equipment, which in the case of 
Chamdor came to R250 000. It also grants 200 per cent tax deductions for all expenses associated with black 
training, which means that for every RIOOO spent on training, R820 is deducted from tax'. 
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In 1977, despite the availability of massive tax incentives, only 3663 African workers were 
trained at government training centres, while the centres had the capacity to handle 14000 
trainees a year (Rand Daily Mail 15/1/79). This complaint was voiced several times thereafter 
(Sunday Times Business Times 3/2/80). Among some of the problems identified which gave 
rise to poor utilisation of these training centres were: 
* Some industrial sectors refused to use the centres because they were in the process of 
setting up their own. 
* 
* 
The centres were too far from the factories of some industrialists and the provision of 
daily transport to the centres for their workers constituted a major problem. 
A shortage of suitable instructors at the centres (Sunday Times Business Times 
22/10/78). 
It is therefore quite clear that the training strategy of the government and employers was 
haphazard, uncoordinated and very disorganised during the 'seventies. Whether facilities and 
resources were duplicated or under-utilised it reflected the existence of ad hoc training 
measures in general and indeed the absence of a coherent industrial training strategy for 
labour. In 1974 P.J. van der Merwe, an academic at the University of Pretoria lamented the 
absence of an active manpower policy in South Africa (and he emphasised training in this 
equation) which he characterised as 'essentially passive and very traditional' (Van der Merwe, 
1974: 196) Some of the measures used to deal with the shortage of skills included the 
relaxation of immigration rules and the token lifting of restrictions on the training of blacks 
(Cullinan, 1980: 111). 
In 1980 'faced with the skills shortage, the government announced its intention in January to 
recruit skilled workers from overseas. In order to promote this, immigration regulations were 
streamlined so that skilled overseas workers no longer needed a firm job offer if they fell into 
work categories where there was a proven shortage. The Minister of the Interior reaffirmed 
the government's policy that immigrant workers would not be allowed to fill jobs where South 
Africans were available for the work. He also announced as part of the streamlining process 
that the assistance to immigrants would be raised above the current R 275 . He stated that all 
immigrants except those from neighbouring states would receive a government contribution 
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towards passage costs amounting to 80% of the actual fare from April 1. This figure would 
be automatically adjusted in accordance with air tariff increases' (SAIRR, 1981 : 93). 
Since 1960, the South African labour market experienced severe shortages of skilled labour. 
Skills shortages created a long term bottleneck in the economy that became really serious 
during periods of economic growth. A significant part of this problem was caused by a severe 
shortage of artisanal labour in South Africa, though in many instances even available sources 
of artisanal labour remained extremely deficient in quality. In this context, the shortage of 
artisan labour had a direct impact on work undertaken by technicians and engineers. 
Shortages of artisan labour required technicians to do work which would normally have been 
undertaken by artisans. It resulted in engineers doing work which would normally have been 
undertaken by technicians. As Mr Naude of the National Training Board explained: 
'At least 20% of the work of engineers should be done by the technician. But there are 
too few technicians ... To complicate things further, the artisan should be doing some 
of the managerial work technicians have to do, but they are obliged by law to do work 
that the operator could do. This is where the skill shortages arise.. . The engineer 
should only be involved in the research, planning and future development of 
production in the industry. The technician could fill the gap at the (High Level 
Manpower) HLM (managerial, administrative, supervisory) level.. . The artisan should 
also move up to fill this gap' (Interview, cited in Kraak, 1989: 30). 
Similar views were articulated to Kraak by Mr Burkes, Training Officer for Scaw Metals who 
wanted to see an increase in job fragmentation: 
'90 % of present artisanal training is wasted.. . what needs to be done is that the 90% 
be broken up into semi-skilled components. The more semi-skilled work you can take 
off the artisan, the more you can allow him to advance into other skill areas... allow 
him to become a better manager, a better organiser, a better planner. .. Our problem is 
not so much a skills shortage problem as much as it is a mismanagement of manpower 
problem' (Kraak, 1989: 30). 
While the state hoped to address the skills shortage dilemma by giving employers greater 
incentives to undertake training and through incentives to immigrants in possession of the 
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requisite skills, employers sought to tackle the skills shortage predominantly through job 
fragmentation and dilution. Unfortunately this raised the ire of the craft unions who 
vigorously resisted these incursions. The state was required to mediate these tensions which it 
did, haphazardly. 
Prior to the passage of the 1981 Manpower Training Act, a limited number of Africans could 
be trained as artisans in the 'independent' homelands. But apprentices trained in the homelands 
could only become artisans in South Africa after taking out homeland citizenship (Star 
21/5/79). A Department of Education and Training spokesperson confirmed this to a 
Financial Mail reporter: 
'We administer trade tests to black artisans, but their certificates are issued by 
homeland governments. They would obviously have to get citizenship papers to get 
the certificate' ( quoted in Financial Mail 19/10/79). 
However, as de Clercq (1984) later showed, apprenticeship training in the homelands was an 
extremely precarious and dubious exercise. De Clercq maintained that such training remained 
poor, underdeveloped and inappropriate. 
'The trade schools or technical institutes suffered from inadequate funding, poor 
workshop equipment and a shortage of qualified instructors and technical teachers. 
Above all, given the limited industrial development of the homelands, there were very 
few apprenticeship opportunities for these students to gain practical on-the-job 
experience under the supervision of a qualified artisan (with the exception of the 
handling trade). As a result, these technical institutes ended up producing semi-skilled 
operators and industrial workers' ( de Clercq, 1984: 8). 
At the level of post-school technical education these problems, especially that of adequately 
qualified instructors, were equally severe in the homelands. Critics concluded that the 
facilities provided for African technical training were not equal to those received by whites and 
therefore also strengthened the white unions' unwillingness to accept African apprentices from 
such colleges {SAIRR, 1982: 129). 
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Guidelines emanating from the Department of Manpower and the National Training Board 
during the mid-eighties anticipated that for apprenticeship training to be effective, it would be 
determined to a greater extent by the private sector in the future.(Department of Manpower & 
National Training Board, 1986) These guidelines stated cogently: 
' ... training institutions and employer and employee organisations offering training 
should comply with the training standards determined by the industry concerned' 
(Department of Manpower and the National Training Board, 1986: para. 2.1). 
It was to lay the basis for the introduction of modularised competency-based training which 
underpinned amendments to the Manpower Training Act in 1990. Essentially, this is the 
system which regulates apprenticeship training currently and while it would be interesting to 
assess its impact, the limited information at my disposal makes it difficult to do so adequately. 
2.6 Conclusion 
Despite the racially exclusive character of apprenticeship training which developed in South 
Africa, the institutional and organisational trajectory of apprenticeship training in this country 
bore strong similarities to that recorded in Britain. The entrenchment of racial segregation in 
the organisation of apprenticeship training gave the apprenticeship system in South Africa a 
specific character. But racial segregation within the apprenticeship system merely delayed the 
responsiveness of the system to straight forward cost considerations. Skilled jobs which could 
be performed more cheaply by semi-skilled workers but which were being preserved by 
discriminatory legislation had a greater chance of being systematically eroded through job 
fragmentation. 
Moreover, because firm-based training ( on-the-job training) often proved to be ineffective and 
disjointed, as was the case in Britain, institutional training in South Africa also came to be 
recognised by the state as a complement to firm based training. An example of this was the 
important role institutional training received in the Training of Artisans Act (1951). At the 
workplace, artisan occupations were being fragmented and diluted and were being undertaken 
more cheaply by semi-skilled non-union operators. Employers justified this process which it 
engineered, as a consequence of shortages of skilled labour. In its fight with the white artisan 
unions over the extension of the boundaries of reservation of jobs to skilled artisan labour, 
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employers often masqueraded as the altruistic champions of black labour. However, the real 
motive of employers was to cheapen the price of labour even if it meant destroying the artisan 
system and the system of training it embodied. 
From the late 1950s to the early 1990s, the trajectory of artisan training in South Africa was 
mediated by complicated struggles over the price oflabour and the definition of skills. 
Chapter 3 continues the analysis of this trend by addressing the empirical regularities and 
anomalies in apprentice and artisan employment between 1969 and 1992. It analyses the 
extent to which these trends represent an erosion of apprenticeship training in the metal and 
engineering industry of South Africa. 
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CHAPTER THREE: EMPIRICAL INDICATORS OF ARTISAN AND 
APPRENTICESHIP EMPLOYMENT IN THE :METAL AND ENGINEERING 
SECTOR, 1969-1992 
3.1 Introduction 
Studies on the occupational structure of South Africa's labour force have tended to offer a 
broad and generalised approach to occupational changes in the economy. Using government 
estimates of labour force participation, which are by no means unambiguous, these studies 
have often addressed the extent to which a modification of the racial composition of the 
division of labour have become discernible. Whether it served as proof of the irreconcilable 
tensions between capitalism and a system of job colour bars on the one hand8 or as an 
expression of the outcome in the structural contradictions and imperatives of capitalism in 
South Africa on the other,9 these analyses offered very little insight into the modification of 
the racial division of labour as it affected particular industries of the manufacturing sector. 
Consequently, one was u~sure if the racial employment hierarchy was being eroded in high 
capital intensive industries at the same tempo as in low capital intensive industries. Nor could 
one aggregate the effects of this phenomenon in stagnant and declining industries compared to 
vibrant and growing industries. Therefore one was really at a disadvantage in accurately 
determining the precise nature of the modification in the racial division oflabour. The exercise 
in tabulating this phenomenon also tended to be extremely pedantic and the statistical methods 
emplctyed were difficult to reconcile with events taking place in reality. 
An exception to this trend is contained in a recent discussion of the changing structure of 
South Africa's workforce which appeared in the South African Labour Bulletin, (Hindson and 
Crankshaw, 1990) where some attention is given to changes in the occupational and racial 
structure of the metal industry. Simkins and Hindson (1979), showed that in the period 
between 1965 and 1985 : 
8 Cf Bromberger (1974) for a classic statement of this position. 
9 A good example is Davies (l 979a). 
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'Semi-skilled employment grew enormously, skilled work (artisanal) grew relatively 
slowly and unskilled actually declined in absolute and relative terms over the period. 
There was also very rapid growth in semi-professional, supervisory and routine 
white-collar work' (Simkins and Hindson, 1979: 30). 
In this chapter attention will be focused on the structure of artisan and apprentice employment 
within the metal industry over the past twenty years 
3.2 Disaggregating Employment Trends Using the Manpower Surveys 
Although the Manpower Surveys represent the most comprehensive and up to date statistical 
surveys from which inferences on the occupational structure in the manufacturing sector can 
be drawn, uncritical tabulation of this data may seriously misconstrue concrete analysis. 10 
Serious deficiencies are evident in constructing an occupational grid for a specific industry on 
the basis of the Manpower Surveys. This does not mean that an occupational grid for all the 
sectors represented in the Manpower Surveys cannot be derived. What it does mean is that an 
industry occupational structure (i.e. micro-scenario) cannot be established without 
encountering serious difficulties, whereas a broad macro-scenario ( all industries and sectors 
contained in the Manpower Surveys) can be adequately derived without sacrificing much 
coherence. 
The first difficulty emerges when an attempt is made to numerically tabulate non-manual 
occupations for specific industries. The Manpower Surveys are arranged occupationally. 
Occupations in tum are grouped functionally. For instance under code 01 are grouped 
professional, semi-professional and technical employees - a categorisation which adheres to 
professional and technical attributes. Examples of occupations which fall within this group 
are: Chemical engineer, mechanical engineer, metallurgical engineer, aeronautical technologist, 
architect, dentist etc.. Under code 02 are grouped managerial, executive and administrative 
10 Despite being constructed from a sample basis, the use of Manpower Surveys can be a tedious and terrifying 
experience to the uninitiated user of labour statistics. For those who wish to derive maximum benefit from 
them, it is advisable to consult those surveys drawn up between 1981 and 1985 first (i.e. Manpower Surveys 
Nos. 14 to 16), since the data there is more precisely set out and clearly demarcated. The more recent surveys 
are published by the Central Statistical Services and although containing much more detail, are clearly more 
difficult to use, mainly because the layout is poor. 
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employees; under code 03 are grouped clerical employees and under code 04 employees 
engaged in sales and related work. With the exception of employees under code 01, none of 
the occupations within these groups are connected to shop floor organisation or manual 
activities. It is also virtually impossible to determine the number of occupations located within 
these four groups which would also be found in a specific industry such as the metal industry. 
This problem of 'correspondence' can only be addressed if one was absolutely certain that 
occupational description was a sufficient criterion in the distribution and allocation of jobs to 
specific industries. However, a cursory glimpse at the Manpower Surveys will quickly dispel 
this conclusion. Using the illustration above listing examples of occupations within group O 1, 
it is quite obvious that a chemical engineer does not necessarily have to work within the 
chemical industry. The chemical engineer may be engaged as a chemical analyst, analysing the 
texture of metals in the metal industry or could be engaged as a chemical analyst in the textile 
industry. Similarly, there is no necessity for a mechanical engineer to be engaged in the metal 
industry, despite the metal or automobile industry deploying these personnel on a larger scale. 
This difficulty is much more serious for occupations listed in groups 02, 03 and 04. It is 
important to be aware of such pitfalls, especially when an attempt is made to construct an 
occupational profile for particular industries because the findings postulated may exaggerate 
the conclusions drawn. Hindson and Crankshaw (1990:30) have attempted to do this for the 
metal industry. 
A second problem which appears to raise difficulties, one that is fairly common in studies on 
occupational mobility, is the juxtaposition and reduction of skilled and unskilled occupations, 
but more so skilled occupations, into a general unambiguous category when constructing 
typologies of occupational profiles within specific industries. 11 It would seem that 
occupations commonly associated with particular and specific industries cannot be 
unproblematically juxtaposed or reduced into a general descriptive and classificatory category 
such as 'artisanal' or 'semi-skilled' etc. without masking very important features . For instance, 
numerical tabulation of black artisanal employment masks the access of artisans to particular 
artisanal occupations. A detailed analysis becomes appropriate and necessary to rectify this 
oversight. 
11 Simkins & Hindson, 1979 and Davies, l 979a are good examples of this trend. 
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3.3 Artisans, Apprentices and Semi-skilled Workers 
Between 1969 and 1991, the growth in artisan positions in South Africa's metal and 
engineering trades has been relatively sluggish, increasing by only 23 .5% over this twenty-two 
year period. Since 1981, the overall growth in artisan numbers has generally been static. 
There has however been a slight alteration in the racial composition of artisan employment 
during this period as can be observed from table 2. 
T bl 2 Art' ' th M t I d E a e : 1sans m e ea an DI T d 1969 1991 meerm2 ra es -
Years White 'Coloured' Asian African Total 
1969 64831 1657 210 
-
66698 
1971 71409 1889 621 
-
73919 
1973 74516 2364 455 - 77335 
1975 75343 3398 566 473 79780 
1977 72428 5027 778 360 78593 
1979 75613 5184 887 717 82401 
1981 77446 6650 1131 1915 87142 
1983 75513 9145 2040 2324 89022 
1985 70746 6306 1697 2731 81480 
1987 67367 6419 2079 4458 80323 
1989 71008 7360 2950 8481 89799 
1991 63355 8589 2900 7540 82384 
Source: Manpower Surveys 1969-1991 
Although the number of white artisans has remained fairly constant, the growth in the total 
artisan labour force which has occurred, has led to a decline in the proportion of white artisans 
in the industry from just over 95% at the beginning of the 'seventies to 76.9% by 1991. This 
shortfall has been made up by an increase in the employment of black artisans, particularly 
African artisans who increased their portion of artisan employment from O. 6% in 197 5 to 
9.2% by 1991. A similar trend occurred in 'coloured' and Asian employment. A peak in 
employment was reached in 1983. It was followed by a sharp reduction thereafter to recover 
only by 1989 but falling again in 1991 . The data assembled in the Manpower Surveys and 
reproduced in table 3 show that the employment of apprentices increased dramatically between 
1977 and 1985, only to decline to little more than the 1969 level by 1991. This evidence tends 
to corroborate the argument that is being advanced about the erosion of apprenticeship 
training by the 1990s. The static nature of artisan employment has also contributed to the 
systematic decline in apprenticeship numbers. 
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Table 3: Apprentices in the Metal and Engineering Trades 1969-1991 
Years White 'Coloured' Asian African Total 
1969 15079 195 42 
-
15316 
1971 15649 317 48 
-
16014 
1973 15423 446 134 
-
16005 
1975 13953 982 73 72 15080 
1977 15675 1719 242 22 17658 
1979 15419 1075 566 146 17206 
1981 18045 2175 639 718 21577 
1983 18720 3548 959 1498 24725 
1985 17429 2225 701 2571 22926 
1987 12428 858 411 1712 15409 
1989 12028 1137 667 2135 15967 
1991 12446 1594 791 1896 16727 
Source: Manpower Surveys 1969-1991 
Small, though significant changes in the racial composition of apprentices occurred during this 
twenty-two year period. In 1969, whites constituted 98.5% of all apprentices employed in the 
metal industry, whereas this ratio had declined to 74.4% by 1991 . Only since 1975 have 
Africans been taken in as apprentices, but by 1991 African apprentices constituted 11.3% of 
the apprentices in the industry, the balance being made up of 'coloureds' (9.5%) and Asians 
(4.7%) who each experienced an equally significant increase. The data assembled in the 
Manpower Surveys only provide a relative distribution of apprenticeship numbers but because 
it provides racial breakdowns of employment patterns, it highlights important trends which the 
actual data has been unable to illuminate. 
Table 4 depicts the actual number of apprentices employed in the metal industry since 1969. 
Although year to year fluctuations in numbers have occurred, these have not been extreme. 
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Table 4: Appre f h · C n ices 1p ·o h M tal Industry 1969-1992 ontracts m 1perahon m t e e 
Year Number 
1969 9435 
1970 9198 
1971 9126 
1972 9485 
1973 9928 
1974 10272 
1975 11059 
1976 11605 
1977 10456 
1978 9795 
1979 9424 
1980 10002 
1981 11033 
1982 12983 
1983 12604 
1984 11790 
1985 10289 
1986 9555 
1987 9059 
1988 8522 
1989 10971 
1990 8202 
1991 9567 
1992 8472 
Sources: CSS, South African Labour Statistics, 1986, 1990 and 1993. Reports of the 
Director-General of Manpower (various). 
During this period, the highest employment was recorded in 1982, but this was only 37.6% 
greater than in 1969 when 9435 apprentices worked in the industry. Since 1982 however, 
there has been a gradual but systematic decline in the numbers of apprentice employment 
recorded. The number of apprentices in 1992 was - 10.2% lower than that recorded 23 years 
before in 1969. It is quite obvious when comparing table 3 with table 4 that the number of 
apprentices in the industry as it is estimated in the sample (Manpower Surveys) and that of the 
actual data (South African Labour Statistics) either do not correspond or the Manpower 
Surveys tend to overestimate the actual number of apprenticeship contracts in existence in the 
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industry. Since the data in the Manpower Surveys are obtained through sampling, the 
deviation may be the result of sampling errors' .12 
Between 1976 and 1992, the metal industry accounted for roughly one-third of all newly 
indentured apprentices in the manufacturing sector. 13 Furthermore, a large proportion 
( approximately one-third) of actual apprentices employed in the industry consisted of newly 
indentured apprentices. Apart from some lag and despite shifts in the business cycle, trends in 
newly indentured apprentice employment do reflect the pattern of apprentice employment in 
the metal industry generally. For instance, in 1982 high points were reached in the number of 
new apprentices indentured and in the total number of apprenticeship contracts operating in 
the industry. However, from 1983 to 1992 there has generally been a consistent decline in the 
total number of apprenticeship contracts. Though not as clear-cut, if not becoming more 
static, there has been a gradual decline in the number of newly indentured apprentices in the 
industry since then, as can be seen from table 5. 
12 In Manpower Survey 1990, the Central Statistical Services note: 'The Survey does not include all 
enterprises, but is undertaken by means of samples. A stratified systematic sample design is used for the 
selection of the samples'. (Manpower Survey 1990. Occupational Information, p.ix.). 
13 Calculation, self. 
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Table 5: Newly Indentured Apprentices According to Population Group in the Metal 
I d n ustry 
Year White 'Coloured' Asian African 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 3233 249 167 
-
1978 2627 177 132 
-
1979 2979 278 101 
-
1980 3145 439 211 27 
1981 3115 534 297 238 
1982 3894 807 426 390 
1983 2723 383 176 295 
1984 2872 392 233 262 
1985 2840 316 278 331 
1986 2694 250 168 258 
1987 2322 247 153 269 
1988 1990 230 146 289 
1989 2877 388 294 471 
1990 - - - -
1991 -
- - -
1992 - - - -
Source: CSS, South African l.Abour Statistics 1986 and 1990; Reports of the 
Director-General of Manpower (various). 
Total 
2532 
2769 
2970 
2960 
3103 
3662 
3592 
3649 
2936 
3358 
3822 
4184 
5517 
3577 
3759 
3765 
3370 
2991 
2655 
4030 
1942 
3911 
1940 
If the trends in the racial distribution of newly indentured apprentice positions are to have any 
bearing on the racial character of artisanal employment in the metal industry in the future, it 
will be imperative for the proportion of black indentured apprentices, particularly African 
being enlarged quite considerably. In 1980 the proportionate racial distribution of newly 
indentured apprentices was as follows: White (82.3%), 'Coloured' (11.5%), Asian (5 .5%) and 
African (0.7%). By 1989 - the last year for which racial breakdowns are provided - the 
situation had only altered slightly and the number of whites in this category was six times 
greater than that of Africans with the distribution being as follows: White (71.4%), 'coloured' 
(9.6%), Asian (7.3%) and African (11.7%). Absolute numerical values of this relationship are 
depicted in table 5. 
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The indenture of apprentices does not as a rule dictate the tempo at which the ranks of the 
artisan category are being augmented. For this, one is required to examine the number of 
trainees who completed contracts of apprenticeship which is exhibited in table 6. 
Table 6: Number of Newly Indentured Apprentices and Number of Trainees who 
completed contracts of apprenticeship in the Metal Industry 1970-1992 
Year 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
Source: 
Newly Indentured Apprentices Trainees who completed contracts of 
Apprenticeship 
2532 2194 
2760 2303 
2970 2046 
2960 1910 
3103 2057 
3662 2219 
3592 2364 
3649 4199 
2936 3043 
3358 3125 
3822 2607 
4184 2378 
5517 2883 
3577 3248 
3759 3987 
3765 4570 
3370 3551 
2991 2974 
2655 2571 
4030 1042 
1942 2052 
3911 2067 
1940 1977 
CSS, South African Labour Statistics 1986 and 1990; Reports of the 
Director-General of Manpower (various). 
From this information we can deduce that the number of newly indentured apprentices 
generally exceeded the number of trainees who completed contracts of apprenticeship and 
were hence qualified to perform artisan duties. In fact for every ten newly indentured 
apprentices for any single year between 1970 and 1992, approximately eight trainees under 
apprenticeship were admitted as artisans. 14 Clearly, on the basis of this evidence it means that 
14 Average for the period 1970-1990. Calculated self. 
65 
should the numbers of newly indentured artisans decline, it will ultimately lead to a 
corresponding drop in the number of apprentices who qualify later as artisans. The evidence 
marshalled thus far appears to substantiate the point that this is indeed happening currently in 
the South African metal industry. 
Apprenticeship training in South Africa tends to be strongly influenced by business cycle 
activity. The HSRC/NTB Report on artisan training observed that the demand cycle for the 
employment of artisans lags the business cycle (HSRC/NTB, 1985: 69). The intake of 
apprentices is directly related to the business cycle. The Report notes: 
' ... in the downturn employers cut back on their apprentice intake because there is no 
work for them to do and because funds that could be used for training have become 
limited' (HSRC/NTB, 1985: 70-71). 
However, the only impact that business cycle activity is likely to exert on qualifying artisans is 
to delay their prospects of landing a job as skilled workers and becoming fully absorbed into 
the labour market. For potential apprentices the onset of a downturn in the business cycle may 
limit opportunities of securing an apprenticeship altogether. 
The largest occupational category in the metal industry consists of operators and semi-skilled 
workers. Black workers constitute the bulk of semi-skilled and related employment as is 
shown in the data presented in table 7 .15 
15 A shortcoming of the data is that it includes operatives in the motor industry too, which would tend to 
inflate figures for the metal industry, but however inflated the figures, its inclusion leads to a degree of 
consistency. 
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Table 7: Operatives, Semi-Skilled and Related Workers in Processing of Metal, Plastics 
or Machine Parts in any Industry Including Operatives in the Motor Industry 1969-
1989 
Year White 'Coloured' Asian African Total 
1969 32603 23124 3848 80366 139941 
1971 30862 27844 5573 96243 160522 
1973 31319 29800 5798 114484 181401 
1975 31172 31098 6284 131450 200004 
1977 25394 27062 5772 160427 218655 
1979 24404 32912 6196 133854 197366 
1981 27769 41442 8198 177224 254633 
1983 29219 33500 6472 166616 235807 
1985 18912 36977 6616 177415 239920 
1987 14058 26773 5412 127075 173318 
1989 21346 28694 5982 206876 262898 
1991 22725 36043 5587 201145 265500 
Source: Manpower Surveys 
In 1969 the racial employment distribution among semi-skilled and related occupations was as 
follows: white (23 .3%), 'coloured' (16.5%), Asian (2.8%) and African (57.4%). The growth 
in total employment from 1969 to 1991 within this category according to the Manpower 
Surveys was 89.7% and amounted to more than double that recorded for artisan employment. 
In the same period the African proportion of the labour force increased from 57.4% in 1969 
to a massive 7 5. 8% in 1991. This proportionate increase in African employment was 
accompanied by declines for the remaining groups; in 1991 these proportions were: white 
(8 .6%), 'coloured' (13.6%) and Asian (2.1%). Of this period, Hindson and Crankshaw 
correctly note: 
'The perpetuation and possible deepening of the racial division of labour in this 
industry was accompanied by an astonishing transformation of the African workforce 
from a largely unskilled to a semi-skilled operative workforce over the period' 
(Hindson and Crankshaw, 1990: 31) 
What is the significance of this evidence? It demonstrates that semi-skilled occupations 
represent a large reservoir from which the ranks of skilled employment categories can be 
,. 
replenished and expanded given appropriate training and industrial strategies. The growth of 
semi-skilled occupations at the expense of unskilled occupations proves that however 
haphazard and minuscule, a transference and an improvement of the skills pool in the metal 
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industry has taken place since the 'sixties. This trend is corroborated by the work of Hindson 
and Crankshaw (1990). Moreover there has been an improvement in the racial distribution of 
occupations, particularly within semi-skilled categories. 
A question which is important to ask at this stage, one that has a direct bearing on the themes 
the thesis is attempting to address, is why under conditions of a massive increase in the 
numerical composition of the labour force in semi-skilled occupations in the metal and 
engineering sector has there not been an equivalent increase in skilled occupations, particularly 
in the artisanal trades? What are the tensions and contradictions which mediate the differences 
between these two poles? Although we are not attempting to answer these questions directly, 
some of the substantive evidence assembled thus far indicates in which direction an argument 
can be developed in order to give an explanation to these questions. 
3.4 Wages and Wage Differentiation 
If one can determine precisely the extent to which statutory regulated industrial council wage 
rates in the metal and engineering industry of South Africa mirror actual wages paid to skilled, 
semi-skilled and unskilled employees covered by industrial council agreements, interesting 
inferences can be drawn about the nature of employment in the industry. This determination is 
important, because statutory regulated wages are the minimum wages paid. It is often the 
floor protecting unorganised and non-unionised employees. Subject to a host of intervening 
conditions, actual wages paid to employees can therefore be higher than statutory regulated 
wage rates. Table 8 shows the nominal wages (current rand amounts) for labourers, 
apprentices and artisans as regulated by the industrial council for the metal and engineering 
industry of South Africa. 
68 
Table 8: Nominal Minimum Weekly Wages (in Rands) of Labourers, Apprentices & 
Artisans as Regulated by the Industrial Council of the Metal and Engineering Industry 
of South Africa 
Year Labourer Apprentice Apprentice Apprentice Apprentice Artisan 
First yr. Second yr. Third yr. Fourth yr. 
1976 24.78 38.01 42.77 52.27 85.52 95.03 
1977 26.56 39.46 44.40 54.26 88.78 98.65 
1978 31.43 45.25 50.91 62.22 101.81 113.13 
1979 35.96 49.78 56.00 68.44 112.00 124.44 
1980 41.40 56.85 63.96 78.17 127.91 142.29 
1981 47.75 63.72 71.69 87.62 143.37 159.30 
1982 64.37 76.60 85.05 104.72 171.36 190.40 
1983 68.90 81.44 91.62 111.98 183.24 203.60 
1984 77.85 89.52 100.71 123.09 201.42 223.80 
1985 85.50 93 .78 105.50 128.95 211.01 234.45 
1986 99.90 105.25 118.40 144.72 236.81 272.12 
1987 117.45 122.61 136.13 168.59 275.87 306.52 
1988 135.90 131.22 147.62 180.43 295.25 328.05 
1989 156.78 151.76 170.73 208.67 341.46 371.78 
1991 196.99 176.46 198.52 242.64 355.70 453 .88 
Source: Government Gazettes 
Although these are only statutory minimum wage rates, it does provide us with a rough 
indication of the trend in actual wage rates, since these are negotiated between organised 
labour and employers within the industrial council. Using this data, one can calculate the 
wage differentials between labourers and other categories of the workforce such as 
apprentices and artisans. This data is reproduced in table 9. 
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Table 9: Differentials between Labourers Wages and that of Apprentices and Artisans 
Year Lab/Appl Lab/App2 Lab/App3 Lab/App4 Lab/Art 
1976 1.53 1.73 2.11 3.45 3.83 
1977 1.49 1.67 2.04 3.34 3.71 
1978 1.44 1.62 1.98 3.24 3.60 
1979 1.38 1.56 1.90 3.11 3.46 
1980 1.37 1.54 1.89 3.09 3.44 
1981 1.33 1.50 1.83 3.00 3.34 
1982 1.19 1.32 1.63 2.66 2.96 
1983 1.18 1.33 1.63 2.66 2.96 
1984 1.15 1.29 1.58 2.59 2.87 
1985 1.10 1.23 1.51 2.47 2.74 
1986 1.05 1.19 1.45 2.37 2.72 
1987 1.04 1.16 1.44 2.35 2.61 
1988 0.97 1.09 1.33 2.17 2.41 
1989 0.97 1.09 1.33 2.18 2.37 
1991 0.90 1.01 1.23 1.81 2.30 
Source: Calculated from table 8. 
From table 9 we can see very clearly that labourer/apprentice differentials over all four levels 
of training and labourer/artisan differentials have declined systematically over the period since 
1976 for which data is used. In 1976, first year apprentices earned one-and-a-halftimes more 
than a labourer, but by 1988, marginally less. In 1991 this had shrunk even further with a first 
year apprentice earning nine-tenths of the labourer's wage. The same trend applied to second, 
third and fourth year apprentices. In view of the reputed shortage of skilled artisans, it was 
surprising that labourer/artisan differentials declined in the same manner. In 1976 an artisan 
earned almost four times the weekly wage of a labourer, but by 1991 this differential had been 
reduced to about two-and-a-third. 
Correspondingly, as table 10 illustrates, declining wage differentials have also been associated 
with a decline in the real wages of apprentices and artisans. 
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Table 10: Real Minimum Industrial Council Weekly Wages (in Rands) of Labourers, 
A f d A . C I I d A d. 1985 B Y ,ppren aces an rt1sans a cu ate ccor m2 to a ase ear 
Year Labourer Apprentice Apprentice Apprentice Apprentice Artisan 
First yr. Second yr. Third yr. Fourth vr. 
1976 75 .09 115.18 129.59 158.39 259.16 287.95 
1977 72.57 107.81 121.30 148.24 242.57 269.52 
1978 77.79 112.00 126.01 154.02 252.01 280.01 
1979 78.69 108.92 122.54 149.76 245.07 272.29 
1980 79.77 109.54 123.23 150.62 246.46 274.16 
1981 79.84 106.56 119.88 146.52 239.75 266.39 
1982 93 .83 111.66 123.98 152.65 249.80 277.55 
1983 89.36 105.63 118.83 145.24 237.67 264.07 
1984 90.52 104.09 117.10 143.13 234.21 260.23 
1985 85.50 93 .78 105.50 128.95 211.01 234.45 
1986 84.23 88.74 99.83 122.02 199.67 229.44 
1987 85.29 89.04 98.86 122.43 200.34 222.60 
1988 87.45 84.44 94.99 116.11 189.99 211.10 
1989 87.98 85 .16 95.81 117.10 191.62 208.63 
1991 83 .83 75.09 84.48 103.25 151.36 193 .14 
Source: Derived from Table 8 using a 1985 base Consumer Price Index 
Using a 1985 base year, wage increases awarded to labourers in industrial council agreements 
in the metal and engineering sector between 1976 and 1991 increased by 11.6% in real terms. 
Diametrically the reverse occurred for apprentices and artisans: between 197 6 and 1991, the 
real wages of first, second and third year apprentices declined by 35%, while that of fourth 
year apprentices and artisans declined by 42% and 33% respectively. A number of factors 
may be responsible for this trend but in our view it might be explained by the more forceful 
growth and impact which the progressive trade union movement has had among the unskilled 
and semi-skilled segment of the workforce in the manufacturing sector. 
The declining wage differentials between skilled and unskilled workers and the declining real 
wages for skilled workers suggests that the substitution of skilled labour by unskilled and 
semi-skilled labour has been taking place. This applies particularly if the classical costs-of-job 
or in-service training model used by Ryan ( 1980) and Metcalf ( 1985) is used to advance an 
explanation about why the usage of a relatively higher priced labour input is declining. This is 
also why unskilled and semi-skilled labour has become more expensive in relation to skilled 
labour. As was shown in chapter one (section 1.3), the model used by Ryan (1980) and 
Metcalf (1985) assumes that the costs of training are borne by the employer as well as the 
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trainee. The costs borne by the trainee is equivalent to the additional rewards which could 
have been earned by doing a different job. The costs of the employer is calculated for the 
period in which the trainee contributes less to the output of the firm than a fully functional 
worker who has already been trained. Employers are therefore inclined to substitute skilled 
labour for unskilled and semi-skilled labour, particularly if it represents a net gain from the 
costs of training. 
At some point though, this trend should have been reversed, because employers could have 
benefitted by engaging more skilled artisan labour at lower real wage rates. The statistics on 
employment trends show that the level of artisan employment has been roughly static over the 
twenty years since 1970. The cheapening of the price of apprentice labour in relation to 
unskilled labour has not resulted in an increase in new contracts for apprentices. Instead the 
number of contracts registered for new apprentices appear to be lower than what they were at 
the beginning of the ' seventies. 
Referring once again to tables 2 and 7, interesting trends can be observed in the growth of 
total employment. From 1975 to 1991, total artisan employment in the industry increased by a 
sluggish 3 .3%. Over the same period, employment for operators and semi-skilled workers 
increased appreciably by 32. 7%. Although data is not available for labourers, a SALDRU 
study revealed a net shedding of unskilled labour in the industry throughout the eighties 
(SALDRU, 1990: p.162), which undermines the thrust ofRyan (1980) and Metcalfs (1985) 
model in this instance, since the usage of a potentially cheaper input is also declining 
comparatively. This evidence corroborates that presented by Hindson and Crankshaw which 
is discussed at the beginning of this chapter. 
Despite the prevalence of economic forces which have favoured the preservation and 
prolongation of apprenticeship training in South Africa, the very opposite has occurred. Even 
though apprentice and artisan labour has become cheaper in relation to unskilled labour, there 
has been an overall decline in the number of artisans and apprentices in the Metal and 
Engineering Industry of South Africa. But as was shown in chapter two of this thesis, the 
forces of job fragmentation and skills dilution have systematically eroded the content of craft 
training. 
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3.5 A Description of Artisanal Occupations 
Before proceeding to discuss the structure of artisan and apprentice employment in the 
industry, it would be appropriate for the clarification of the reader to give a brief description 
of the major artisanal occupations found in the metal and engineering industry. 16 Broadly, 
these may be separated into maintenance occupations and fabrication or construction 
occupations. The most important maintenance occupations among artisans embrace 
mechanics, fitting, mill-wrighting and welding. 
'The fitter maintains and repairs machines' and 'must be able to strip a machine, identify the 
fault and reassemble the machine in good working order'. The ability to do 'maintenance work 
on a variety of machinery' is essential. A fitter must be thoroughly conversant with 'hand tools 
and measuring instruments, as well as have an understanding of hydraulic and pneumatic 
systems' (Bryce, 1989: 570). 
The mill-wright is chiefly responsible for production machines and equipment being in good 
working order so that production is not hampered by breakdowns. A mill-wright therefore 
traces and repairs faults in equipment. A mill-wright must have a comprehensive electrical and 
mechanical knowledge in order to dismantle and repair 'electrically driven machines and 
electronic control gear' . Often the mill-wright is required to 'make temporary repairs until the 
right parts are available' (Bryce, 1989: 572). The mill-wright is also responsible for the 
mechanical and electrical installation of machines. 
Among the chief construction and fabrication occupations in the metal and engineering 
industry are: boiler-making, fitting and turning, moulding, pattern-making, structural plating, 
tool, jig and die making, turning and welding. 
'Boilermakers work in the heavy engineering, construction and pressure vessel manufacturing 
industries amongst others'. They are trained to 'make structures from ste'el plate' which can 
16 This section is drawn from the section 'Metal and Engineering Industry' in A.Bryce, 1989,pp.564-576,and 
contains information supplied by the Metal and Engineering Industries Education and Training Board. 
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'range from boilers for steam engines and pressure vessels for power stations and 
petrochemical plants to mine head-gears, bridges and oil-drilling platforms'. Besides being 
able to do mechanical drawing, boilermakers also cut steel plate to specified dimensions and 
bend it 'into the right shapes, using hand tools, bending brakes, rolling machines and heating 
procedures'. Finally the boilermaker 'assembles the various parts and prepares the object for 
welding' (Bryce, 1989: 566). 
Fitting and turning involves the machining and precise construction of metal components for 
machinery and installations. It also includes assembly and fitting. For example, the fitter and 
turner 'may dismantle a gearbox, inspect the gears and gear shafts for wear, faults and 
damage'. If necessary, a new shaft will be turned, aligned and reassembled with the gearbox. 
The fitter and turner 'works from drawings or models in a variety of materials and uses a lathe 
to produce parts such as shafts, threads, bushes and couplings' (Bryce, 1989: 570). 
'Moulders work in foundries and similar establishments. They form moulds in special sand, 
into which molten metal is poured to produce castings. Castings range in shape and size from 
aluminium motor car engine blocks to bogies for under-frame locomotives. It is the moulder's 
job to ensure that moulds are technically correct, so as to produce castings of a high standard' 
(Bryce, 1989: 573). 
Pattern-making involves the making of patterns 'from materials such as wood, plastic, 
fibreglass and metal' using woodworking machines, sawing machines and lathes. The patterns 
are used to manufacture 'castings for products such as pumps and bearings. The 
pattern-maker works from drawings, selects the material and marks it to size. It is then cut or 
sawed, finished off and assembled into the pattern or model which is used by the moulder to 
form moulds or castings' (Bryce, 1989: 573). Webster has described the pattern-maker as the 
'architect of the foundry process' (Webster, 1985, plate 3). 
The structural plater 'fabricates and constructs structures of steel plate' . After marking the 
steel plate, the structural plater cuts it into the correct dimensions 'using cutting torches or 
guillotines', after which it is bent 'into the right shapes, using either hand or mechanical tools' 
(Bryce, 1989: 575). Thereafter, the different parts are assembled and prepared for welding. 
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A tool, jig and die-maker is generally regarded as a highly skilled craftsman and 'makes 
various metal dies which, when fitted into a press, will enable a component to be manufactured 
quickly and to exact measurements. A "tool" in this trade is a device which cuts a sheet of 
metal to the required shape and size, the "die" bends the component into a three-dimensional 
shape and the "jig" holds it so that it can be accurately machined. The tool, jig and die-maker 
uses a large number of machines, including milling machines, lathes, drilling and boring 
machines and surface and cylindrical grinders' (Bryce, 1989: 575). For each component to be 
exactly the same, it is important that the tools are made to the exact required specifications. 
A turner uses lathes of different sizes to "'tum" metal objects into the required shape' (Bryce, 
1989: 576). These can range from screw threads, axles, crankshafts and bearings. 
The work of a welder can range from repair and maintenance welding to construction and 
fabrication welding on many types of metal. Examples of jobs where welders may be engaged 
are 'the building and maintenance of pipelines, boilers, nuclear reactors and motor cars' (Bryce, 
1989: 576). Welding may be seen as a finishing process with very wide applicability in the 
industry. 
Without unnecessary over-simplification, it can be suggested that on the basis of the 
occupations described above, certain occupations such as tool, jig and die-making and 
pattern-making would require a more thorough training and greater skills to fulfil than 
boiler-making or fitting and turning. An occupation such as welding may be taught and 
functionally acquired in a shorter space of time than numerous other occupations described 
above, even though it would take long experience and a greater length of supervision to gain 
absolute mastery of it. Another dimension may be added to the discussion. Woodward for 
instance argues that skills can be further viewed along two dimensions. 
'Firstly, there is the depth of skill. This reflects in the time taken to complete a given 
task. Secondly, there is the breadth of skills. This reflects the range of jobs that can be 
carried out' (Woodward, 1975: 38). 
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Experienced workers in most job categories would therefore have a greater skill depth as they 
can accomplish tasks more speedily. Highly skilled occupations, especially the craft 
occupations would exhibit a greater job breadth. When we discuss the modification of the 
racial division of labour in South Africa in terms of the structure of artisan and apprentice 
employment in the 'eighties, it will become quite clear that black artisanal employment and 
apprenticeship training is heavily concentrated in occupations where functional attributes and 
skills are acquired sooner. In fact, the job breadth of these occupations is qualitatively less 
than for the more skilled occupations where white artisans are more concentrated 
proportionally. 
3.6 The Structure of Artisan and Apprentice Employment in the 'Eighties 
Evidence contained in the Manpower Survey of 1987, which provides more systematic 
breakdowns of employment categories than those contained in later surveys, reveals that the 
bulk of artisan employment in the metal and engineering trades are concentrated in a limited 
number of occupational types, or job categories. Occupational types for white artisans cover a 
wider spectrum - 74.05% of white artisans in 1987 were to be found in only five different 
occupational types, the largest being boilermakers/platers (13 .63%), fitter and turners 
(3 1.83%) and fitters (15 .64%). Despite this, the wide occupational spectrum, as I argue 
below, presents white apprentices with greater occupational choices when embarking on a 
career. 
Job categories for black artisans are more narrowly demarcated. Black artisans therefore tend 
to be located in more limited number of occupational types. A high occupational 
concentration ratio is evident from the following statistics: five occupational types account for 
83.25% of 'coloured' artisan employment, eight for 89.56% of Asian artisan employment and 
six for 72.06% of African artisan employment. The majority of'coloured' artisans worked as 
boilermakers (26.53%), fitter and turners (13 .29%) and welders (31.01%). Asian artisans 
appear to be gradually holding more skilled positions proportionally than other black artisans 
but are mainly employed as boilermakers ( 10. 49% ), construction steel/architectural 
metalworkers ( 15. 54 % ), fitter and turners ( 14. 91 % ), instrument makers and 
repairers/mechanics (11 .93%) and sheet metalworkers (14.72%). The majority of African 
artisans are employed as boilermakers ( 13 .16% ), fitter and turners (7. 9% ), fitters (8 . 99% ), 
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sheet metalworkers (8.36%) and welders (28.45%). The rapid introduction of new 
technological applications to the metal and engineering industry such as robot arc welders17 
implies that workers in job categories where robots are being used, and who are not retrained 
for other occupations may well be the first segment of skilled workers to experience 
retrenchment and redundancy. 
New job entrants, particularly black entrants whose perceptions of labour market employment 
are shaped by prevailing limitations and opportunities are therefore presented with fewer 
occupational choices. Their points of entry into the industry as apprentices would therefore be 
more limited. 
Although the majority of white apprentices in 1987 were being trained as boilermakers 
(12.18%), fitter and turners (32.04%), fitters (10.04%) and millwrights (9.96%), white 
apprentices generally were being trained on a larger scale numerically in occupations covering 
the entire range of job types. The converse prevailed for black apprentices. Black apprentices 
were almost confined and rigidly trapped within particular types of occupations. For instance, 
the majority of 'coloured' apprentices were being trained as boilermakers (25 .29% ), fitter and 
turners (24.94%), fitters (17.72%) and as toolmakers, tool and jigmakers and toolsetters 
( 11. 07%) while the majority of Asian apprentices were being trained as boilermakers 
(19.46%), fitter and turners (27.01%) and fitters (25 .06%). The majority of African 
apprentices (78.84%) were being trained in only three types of occupation. These were: 
boilermaking (22.27%), fitting and turning (27.47%) and fitting (29.11 %). 
Ifwe change the basis of our calculation slightly, it becomes quite clear that according to the 
Manpower Survey of 1987, white apprentices still constituted 80.66% of all metal industry 
apprentices in training, while 'coloureds' made up 5.57%, Asians 2.67% and Africans 11.10%. 
In comparison to its proportion of artisans (5 .55%), the proportion of African apprentices in 
training was more favourable. Although the actual reasons may be more complex, this skewed 
distribution may be attributed in no small measure to the more flexible approach adopted by 
17 Kaplan (1991: 19-20), notes that robot arc welders are very popular in South Africa and their usage can be 
expected to spread rapidly in the near future. 
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some enlightened representatives of capital 18 to address the shortage of skilled labour in South 
Africa by training blacks, in trades that were previously not open to them. 
3. 7 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided substantial empirical evidence showing changes in the structure of 
artisan and apprentice employment in the metal industry over the past twenty years. It 
empirically consolidates the core argument the thesis makes, namely that the apprenticeship 
system in South Africa has experienced a gradual and systematic erosion. However, the 
erosion of the apprenticeship system has not be,!n an even process. Particular spheres of the 
artisan system have only been marginally affected by this process and old hierarchies between 
artisans (predominantly white artisans) and unskilled labourers (predominantly black 
labourers) have been preserved. Within artisan occupations which are characterised by a 
narrower skills breadth (e.g . welding) and which therefore require a more limited set of 
generic skills (for a job to be undertaken competently and efficiently), the erosion has been 
more severe. In these sectors, the seperation between skilled and semi-skilled occupations has 
become much narrower, signifying that the erosion of artisan trades has been more dramatic. 
This evidence is reflected in the growth of semi-skilled occupations in many metal and 
engineering trades. 
In chapter four, an even more microscopic dimcmsion of apprenticeship training is analysed in 
order to ascertain the extent to which the institutional fabric of the apprenticeship system was 
itself undergoing severe strains. This is done by studying data on trade test results in order to 
show how these results reflected the structural t,!nsions of the apprenticeship system. 
Attention is also drawn to the constraints and limitations which the size of firms and the nature 
of the industrial organisation within such firms iinpose on the training regimes that can be 
implemented at the workplace. 
18 The chairman's review ofHighveld Steel's operations in 1986 carried the following statement: 'For the 
period under review the corporation continued to train apprentices at the same rate as in 1985. The total 
number of apprentices remained at 300, of whom 53 wen! black' (i.e. African P.L). (Reproduced in Argus 
11/3/1987). 
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CHAPTER FOUR: ARTISAN TRADE TEST RESULTS AS AN INDICATOR 
OF THE EROSION OF APPRENTICESHIP TRAINING 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter has three aims. First, it sets out to analyse trade test results in the metal industry 
between 1971 and 1992. Second, it addresses the influence of the size and organisation of 
enterprises in the metal industry on the trade test pass rates of apprentices who were in the 
process of qualifying as artisans. Third, it gives an insight into the testing procedures of 
artisans in the metal and engineering industry. 
The reason why this is done, is to show that while the apprenticeship system was enduring 
severe strains as an instrument of industrial training as has been shown in chapters two and 
three, other contradictory features were being exhibited within the system. These took two 
distinct forms. In the one form, the internal mechanisms for assessing the quality of artisans 
produced was inconsistent, because potential artisans were being examined for an inflexible set 
of reasons. In the other form, the assessment of artisans ignored the industrial and 
organisational milieu in which apprentices were being trained. Yet these structural features of 
the apprenticeship system had a debilitating effect on the output of artisans. The important 
elements in the equation were the large variation in the size of firms and the strong variation in 
the complexity of production organisation within these firms. In fact, contradictory signals 
were being emitted about the reasons for low trade test results of artisans. The focus of 
attention tended to be directed almost exclusively towards the quality of apprentice that was 
being indentured, ignoring a whole host of other contributory causes. Institutional inertia in 
responding timeously to crises in apprenticeship training (and the low level of trade test 
successes was merely one manifestation of it), was itself a symptom of crisis. It represented a 
crisis in the institutions of the state to govern and manage human resources development 
effectively. 
4.2 Trade Test Results in the Metal Industry 
One index which has served commentators with a stark barometer of the health of artisan 
industrial training in South Africa have been the results obtained from trade tests 
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(HSRC/NTB, 1985: 13; Meth, 1979). The incidence oflow trade test results can lead to one 
of two interpretations. Either, the standards set by examining bodies are too high or the 
standard oflearning of the examinees is dismally low. The literature surveyed has not 
recorded any evidence which proves the validity of the first proposition and has therefore 
focused more attention on the latter proposition. Statistical evidence shows that the pass rate, 
particularly for apprentices in the metal industry was exceptionally low. Roughly more than 
half of apprentices in this industry who sat for their trade test examinations failed . While it 
was permissible to have two attempts at passing the examination, those who were 
unsuccessful or chose not to do the examinations again, qualified as artisans by what was then 
referred to as the 'effluxion of time' when the contract of apprenticeship came to a close and 
they were automatically awarded a trade certificate. Since it reflected the quality of skilled 
workers in South Africa, it was viewed with deep consternation by employers dependent on 
highly skilled artisanal labour. Yet, little was done to rectify it until the 'eighties when 
educational entry requirements for apprentices in some industries were raised in some 
instances, after the appointment of a commission of enquiry under the auspices of the Human 
Sciences Research Council(HSRC) and the National Training Board(NTB). 
However, the precise reasons for the phenomenon of low trade test pass rates are rather more 
complex and varied. Indeed it relates to the institutional fabric governing artisan training in 
South Africa and ranges from the politically inspired entrenchment of job reservation and the 
lukewarm commitment of the majority of employers to training, to the lackadaisical statutory 
enforcement of training requirements, as has been shown in chapter two of this thesis. 
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Table 11: Trade Test Results in the Metal Industry 
Year Trade Test Results Passes Passes 
Undertaken Number Percentage 
1971 3536 958 27.1 
1972 2708 789 29.1 
1973 2849 879 30.9 
1974 3284 1009 30.7 
1975 3172 986 31.1 
1976 3221 1166 36.2 
1977 4107 1422 34.6 
1978 4652 1822 39.2 
1979 4023 1714 42.6 
1980 3302 1534 46.5 
1981 3552 1700 47.9 
1982 4154 1900 45 .7 
1983 5360 2343 43 .7 
1984 5944 2494 42.0 
1985 5972 2709 45.4 
1986 4588 2045 44.6 
1987 4016 1971 49.1 
1988 3653 1823 49.9 
1989 3663 1842 50.3 
1990 3403 1795 52.7 
1991 3579 1824 51.0 
1992 4262 2240 52.6 
Source: CSS, South African Labour Statistics 1986 and 1990; Reports of the Director-
General of Manpower (various) 
Table 11 depicts the pass rate among apprentices in the metal and engineering industry since 
1971. Throughout this period the level of trade test passes has generally been below fifty per 
cent. Ironically, the results recorded during the 'seventies, when job reservation and racial 
exclusion was rigorously enforced were much lower than the 'eighties when the Manpower 
Training Act made provisions for the acceptance of more black, particularly African, 
candidates to apprenticeship training programmes. 
Throughout this period technical colleges where apprentices were required to obtain 
theoretical instruction remained racially segregated.(Bot, 1988) Despite efforts by big 
business to sponsor private training institutions that provided accredited training for black 
apprentices, a significant number of African apprentices received their theoretical instruction at 
technical colleges and institutions based in the homelands. Although the statistics do not give 
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a breakdown of the industries from which apprentices taking the trade test were located, the 
total number of apprentices successfully completing the trade test in the homelands was very 
small and the pass rate was much lower than in the remainder of the country. This data is 
reproduced in table 12. 
Table 12: Trade Test Results in the Independent Homelands and Self-governing 
territories, 1986-1992 
National States 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Passed % Passed % Passed % Passed % Passed % Passed % Passed % 
Tramkei S7 23.1 64 30.0 43 26.4 37 19.S 40 21.1 29 22.8 41 30.4 
Bopbutatswana 103 29.3 172 27.S 73 29.1 33 18.1 37 24.8 44 28.9 61 36.1 
Venda 28 20.6 64 22.2 IS IS.O 24 27.0 22 17.9 28 31.1 39 33.1 
Ciskei S7 39.0 74 3S.6 19 2S.O 16 26.2 22 27.8 18 31.6 9 20.0 
Self-Governing 
Territories 
Kwazulu 8S 31.8 ISi 33.0 S4 37.0 20 17.7 42 31.8 32 2S.8 69 43.4 
Lebow a 4S 23.1 79 2S.S S7 31.S 28 18.8 22 20.0 21 23.9 32 29.1 
Gazank.ulu 40 20.9 73 21.0 28 16.8 IS 13.6 34 23.0 34 29.8 31 2S.O 
Source: Annual Reports of the Department of Manpower (various). 
4.3 The Influence of Enterprise Size and Organisation on trade test pass rates 
Trade test results in South Africa hide much more than they actually reveal. Apprentices are 
trained in large and small enterprises, in parastatals and in private concerns - all under 
distinctly different training regimes. Although it is quite difficult to draw conclusive inferences 
on the extent of training in different concerns, one can develop conclusions on the quality of 
training undertaken on the basis of the little bit of evidence that has been assembled over the 
past decade with regard to training facilities and the commitment these concerns have had 
towards artisanal training. 
A study by Meth (1979: 58-59), suggested that public sector firms (parastatals) provide a 
higher level of training to apprentices than do private sector firms. This conclusion was 
reached after comparing the trade test results of apprentices indentured at private sector metal 
firms during 1976 and 1977. In 1976 the pass rate for ISCOR's apprentices was 49.6% and 
for those indentured at private sector metal firms it was 31 . 9%. As a parastatal, ISCOR' s 
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standard of training was of a better quality than that offered at private metal firms . Because 
ISCOR accounted for such a high proportion of metal and engineering apprentices, this raised 
the average percentage pass rate in the industry to 36.2%. A similar situation prevailed in 
1977. Whereas the pass rate ofISCOR's apprentices taking the trade test increased over the 
previous year, that for apprentices in private metal sector firms declined to 29.9% in 1977. 
Similarly, the decline in the pass rate for trade tests in private metal firms in 1977, contributed 
to a decline in the average trade test pass rate for the industry over the previous year. Data 
from Meth's study is reproduced in table 13 below. 
Table 13: Comparative Trade Test Results in the Metal (Engineering) Industry 
Total Metal (Eng) I SCOR The Rest 
No. Entering: 1976 3221 776 2445 
No. Entering: 1977 4107 797 3310 
No. Passing: 1976 1166 385 781 
No. Passing: 1977 1422 432 990 
Pass Rate(%): 1976 36,2 49,6 31,9 
Pass Rate (%) : 1977 34,6 54,2 29,9 
Source: Meth, 1979, p. 75. 
On the basis of this study Meth came to the following conclusion: 
'These results seem to bear out the widely-held belief that public sector apprentice 
training facilities and programmes, are in general superior to those offered by the 
private sector'.(Meth, 1979: 75) 
In a footnote to this discussion Meth indicated too, that ISCOR (at the time a fully fledged 
parastatal) employed approximately 18% of the workers in the industry but trained roughly 
33% of the apprentices.(Meth, 1979: 89, n.34) 
Almost ten years later a study by Kraak produced evidence which confirmed that large firms 
tended to train a greater proportion of apprentices than small firms. 
' ... SEIFSA, the employer association in the industry, reports that of the few large 
corporations in the metal industry, 12 of them are responsible for recruiting almost 
33% of the metal apprentices per annum. Only 60 firms, all mostly large or medium 
sized companies, have their own training centres. Of the 8000 members, 1000 do full 
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apprenticeship training, 5000 do minimal training, and 2000 small companies do no 
training whatsoever'.(Kraak, 1988: 88-89) 
Juxtaposed, despite a ten year hiatus, these statistics indicate roughly that twelve large 
corporations from a sample of 8000 employers were responsible for the training of 
approximately one-third of all apprentices in the metal and engineering industry in South 
Africa. 
Two very significant points are raised in the work of Meth and Kraak: firstly, that nationalised 
enterprises are more inclined to engage in the training of artisans than non-nationalised 
enterprises; secondly, that large companies are more likely to train artisans in South Africa 
than small companies. 
Certainly, the relationship between company size and plant size is not unilinear. Large 
companies could contain small plants, while small companies could constitute a few large 
plants. The Metal sector consists of five separate though inter-related industries.(Central 
Statistical Services, 1982; 1985 and 1988). These industries are: Basic Iron and Steel, Basic 
Non-ferrous metal, Metal Products, Machinery and Equipment and Electrical Machinery. It is 
interesting to observe that the Basic Iron and Steel Industries account for the largest 
proportion of output of Metal sector industries but together with Basic Non-Ferrous Metal 
contains the smallest proportion of firms . 
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Table 14: Relation between Industry sizes and firm numbers in metal sector 
Industries in % Proportion % Proportion of Firms 
Metal Sector of output 
(1985 data) 1979 1982 1985 1988 
Basic Iron 30.39 3.55 4.04 3.51 2.90 
and Steel 
Basic Non- 9.18 2.22 1.90 1.84 1.67 
Ferrous 
Metal 
Metal 25.83 51.99 50.03 49.14 49.16 
Products 
Machinery & 19.25 27.82 29.85 31.47 31.17 
Equipment 
Electrical 15.35 14.42 14.18 14.04 15.1 0 
Machinery 
Source: Calculated from Manufacturing Census Statistics. 
In 1985, 3.51% of all Metal sector firms were located in the manufacturing of Basic Iron and 
Steel and accounted for 30.39% of output. In contrast to this 49.14% of the firms were 
concentrated in the Metal Products and 31.47% in the Machinery and Equipment Industries. 
However, in terms of output they only generated 25% and 19% respectively. By 1988 these 
figures still remained roughly the same: Metal Product firms accounted for 49.16% of firms in 
the metal and engineering sector, but 24.52% of output, while firms in Machinery and 
Equipment constituted 31.17% of firms but contributed to 20.5% of output in the sector. 
(Calculated from Central Statistical Services, Census of Manufacturing, 1988) 
This evidence suggests that there are a large proportion of small firms in the Metal Products 
and Machinery and Equipment Industries and that the overall size of firms is smaller than 
would be the case in Basic Iron and Steel Industries. 
Table 15 defines the size of a plant in terms of the numbers employed. The table demonstrates 
that in the Metal sector on the whole, the majority of firms employ less than one hundred 
employees. The number of firms operating in Basic Iron and Steel and Basic Non-Ferrous 
Metal Industries are far fewer than the number operating in the other sectors of the Metal 
Industry. The average size for both sectors ranges between 20-99 employees. For all the 
other sectors the plant size is much smaller and ranges between 0-19 employees. In 1988, 
more than half of the firms in the Fabricated Metal Products Industry (64%), the Machinery 
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Industry (64.9%) and the Electrical Machinery Industry (59.9%) had less than twenty 
employees. Small firms thus dominate production in the Metal sector. 
Table 15: Plant Sizes According to Employment Levels 
Iron and Steel Basic Industries 
No. of Employees 1979 1982 1985 1988 
0-19 41 59 52 41 
20-99 62 90 79 85 
100-499 58 66 54 54 
500-999 11 16 12 13 
1000+ 14 13 14 13 
Total 186 244 211 206 
Non-Ferrous Metal Basic Industries 
No. of Employees 1979 1982 1985 1988 
0-19 35 35 30 47 
20-99 45 42 47 35 
100-499 27 26 25 28 
500-999 3 6 3 3 
1000+ 6 6 6 6 
Total 116 115 111 119 
Fabricated Metal Products 
No. ofEmolovees 1979 1982 1985 1988 
0-19 1675 1786 1831 2236 
20-99 771 907 840 980 
100-499 235 287 253 251 
500-999 28 26 24 18 
1000+ 12 17 10 11 
Total 2721 3023 2958 3496 
Machinerv, except Electrical 
No. ofEmolovees 1979 1982 1985 1988 
0-19 821 1083 1132 1439 
20-99 459 541 588 606 
100-499 152 144 149 145 
500-999 20 23 17 19 
1000+ 4 13 8 8 
Total 1456 1804 1894 2217 
Electrical Machinery 
No. ofEmolovees 1979 1982 1985 1988 
0-19 427 476 469 643 
20-99 211 245 254 304 
100-499 87 103 89 91 
500-999 20 19 24 23 
1000+ 10 14 9 13 
Total 755 857 845 1074 
Metal Sector Overall 
No. ofEmployees 1979 1982 1985 1988 
0-19 2999 3439 3514 4406 
20-99 1548 1825 1808 2010 
100-499 559 626 570 569 
500-999 82 90 80 76 
1000+ 46 63 47 51 
Overall Total 5234 6043 6019 7112 
Source: Manufacturing Census Statistics 
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The difference in the size of finns (i.e. defined by the number employed) between various 
sectors of the metal industry, can be explained by the following: In the Basic Iron and Steel 
and the Basic Non-Ferrous Metal Industries more processing of raw materials takes place in 
the foundries and blast furnaces thus requiring a larger workforce than would be necessary in 
the remaining industries where more specialised machine-cutting, boring and finishing 
processes are perfonned by a numerically smaller but technically more skilled workforce. 
Hence the structure of the industry detennines the optimum plant size. These comparisons are 
drawn to ascertain the generality of capital intensity and choice of technique because 
ultimately these two factors would have a bearing on the quality of the training regimes at the 
enterprise level. 
An ideal situation for an apprentice who wants to become a well trained and effective artisan is 
to do an apprenticeship in a large finn which undertakes specialised manufacturing activities. 
This is because there is a greater probability for large finns to train its apprentices according to 
guidelines laid down by the Apprenticeship Act. There is also a greater probability for 
apprentices who are employed in finns which undertake specialised activities to be trained in 
one or other specialised craft. It is more likely that had statistics been available, it would show 
a greater propensity for apprentices in such finns successfully passing the trade test. 
Both Meth and Cullinan have proffered reasons for the apparently low trade test results that 
have been experienced in South Africa, particularly in the metal industry. Meth argued that 
the enforcement of job reservation implied that suitably qualified coloured, Asian and African 
candidates were excluded from admission to apprenticeship training programmes. Yet, entry 
requirements for white apprentices were flouted continuously, not only in the metal industry 
but in a spectrum of industries, to enable employers to indenture the number of apprentices 
they were able and willing to adopt. Using data to support his thesis of the inherent structural 
deficiencies and inefficiencies in the training arena, Meth noted with apprehension: 
'If Junior Certificate had been enforced as an entry qualification in 1962 in the Durban 
area, fully 80 per cent of the indentured motor mechanics and 72 per cent of the 
general engineering apprentices of the time would have been ineligible for 
apprenticeship. Of 267 apprentices who attended college for at least 3 years, 37.5 per 
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cent never passed any trade theory subject and a further 32.5 per cent passed only 
NTC I Trade Theory' (Meth, 1979: 63-64). 
Similarly: 
'The practice of granting wholesale exemptions to whites who had not attained the 
very modest entry qualifications necessary for entry to a trade, coupled with exclusion 
of suitably qualified Africans, coloureds and Asians, throws into sharp relief, the 
inequities of the present system. The building industry, picturesquely described as 
having gone "black" provides an example of the first practice. Gibson quoting the 
Master Builders and Allied Trades Association (Durban) Report of the year ended 31 
December 1969, shows that 94 per cent of"non-white" apprentices (466 out of 496) 
could meet the entrance qualification of standard VII whereas 50 per cent of the whites 
(85 out of 170) had to be exempt' (Meth, 1979: 64). 
Cullinan drew attention first to the large number of designated trades in the metal and 
engineering industry which were seen to contribute to the low pass rate for trade tests. 
Because these trades are covered by statutes which regulate wages, conditions of employment 
and training standards, they are referred to as designated trades. More than half of the 
forty-three designated trades were in the metal and engineering industries. It constituted a 
problem, because each designated trade followed a different curriculum and set different 
practical requirements for training. Firms which engaged artisans in a number of designated 
trades found it difficult to spare these in each designated trade to supervise apprentices in each 
of them. The second problem encountered was that of the wide industrial dispersal of 
apprentices undergoing training in this industry. Because of the complexity of industrial 
organisation, firms often tend to employ artisans and apprentices in operational activities 
which would not necessarily be classified as part of its core functions. For instance, it is not 
uncommon for firms in the building industry to employ electricians and to take on apprentice 
electricians as well . The same applies to welders in the mining industry and machine 
mechanics in the garment industry. Employers argued that they were compelled to provide 
their apprentices with the prescribed training in the designated trade irrespective of the 
industrial sector in which their apprentices operated. As Cullinan paraphrased the argument: 
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'Thus, the construction industry would, for example, have to give their apprentice 
fitters, platers, welders etc., the same training as the equivalent apprentice would 
receive if he were to be trained within the Metal and Engineering Industries. Therefore 
all apprentices regardless of whether they operate in mining, chemicals, plastics or 
metal have to undergo the same test at the COTT centre. The COTT system thus 
provides for the testing of undifferentiated apprentices' (Cullinan, 1980: 63). 
One can give a litany of reasons that partially explain the incidence of low trade test results in 
South Africa. However, a great deal more is reqaired to understand the reasons for this 
phenomenon. These reasons as Williams has shown in her comparison between the apprentice 
training systems of Germany and Britain are structural and institutional. Only by coming to 
terms with the institutional fabric of training in a particular country can effective structural and 
remedial changes be made which can reverse ill-conceived-and ill-defined training systems. 
There is an institutionally regulated discrimination against ill-qualified and non-certified 
tradesmen in Germany which serves as an inducement and motivation for them to enter the 
industry with the appropriate qualifications. Since Germany is an extremely credential 
conscious society, certification gives individuals greater access to skilled jobs and also enables 
them to be employed with greater security of tenure. 
At the time of writing, Williams noted that a journeyman who had reached the age of 24 in 
Germany could submit to theoretical and practical tests of a higher standard to acquire a 
master's patent. It enabled journeymen to obtain registration at the Chamber of Handicrafts. 
Without such a registration it was forbidden for anyone becoming an employer or to take on 
apprentices. This requirement guaranteed 'that those who set up in business in those trades 
have acquired a certain standard of competence which protects the public employing their 
services or buying their products' (Williams, 1963 : 32). 
It created pressure both on employers and their apprentices to strive towards the achievement 
of success. 
'The employer knows that, if there is a more than proportionate rate of failure among 
his apprentices, questions will be asked which may lead to his name being removed 
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from the register of those to whom apprentices may be contracted. And the apprentice 
recognises that he will not acquire skilled status unless he sets himself to master the 
work. Those who are familiar with both German and British conditions say that the 
German apprentice is more driven to learn because both he and his instructor know 
that any failure to do so cannot be hidden. In British firms, even where training is 
taken very seriously, there is not the same drive because there is no established goal of 
achievement' (Williams, 1963 : 39). 
Similar to the British system, the system of apprenticeship training in South Africa made 
provision for apprentices to become artisans, enabling them to automatically acquire a trade 
certificate through a time-based system. This situation prevailed until the introduction and 
statutory formalisation of competency based modular training for apprentices in 1990. 
Closer examination of the evidence in South Africa however showed that apprenticeship 
training reveals nuances not recognised in the statistics. As a response to variations in the 
standards of training, artisans might have unintentionally stimulated job mobility to rectify 
deficiencies in training standards. On the basis of some common-sense experience and 
intuition, Van Gass ( 1972) argued that such a trend might have manifested itself in South 
Africa. Van Gass suggested that well trained apprentices who had been trained under modem 
and sophisticated technical conditions in advanced firms and became competent artisans were 
more likely to migrate to smaller industries where they could enjoy greater respect and earn 
higher wages. This meant greater authority and responsibility at the workplace. It was the 
less competent and less versatile artisan who had been trained in smaller, ill-equipped plants 
who tended to move to advanced firms, where the more modem and sophisticated technical 
conditions gave them an opportunity to expand their training. (Van Gass, 1972: 34). Our 
examination of the British, German and Nigerian apprenticeship system in chapter one showed 
that this trend was highly prevalent in Germany. 
This argument suggests that large firms in South Africa who have trained the bulk of artisans, 
and still do, would ultimately not experience a shortage in the recruitment of artisans, despite 
losing most of them to poachers. This is because many qualified artisans would still be 
prepared to work for such firms . These firms would however experience a shortage of 
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competent artisans - competent to the level and standards to which its own apprentices and 
artisans were trained. 
An in-depth study by Kraak showed that the very low trade test pass rate for artisans had quite 
a dramatic impact on production efficiency, especially in small firms and enterprises engaged in 
contractual and jobbing operation. Many of these firms often required well qualified and 
versatile artisans to undertake difficult and complex operations which could not easily be 
mechanised. According to an employer interviewed by Kraak: 
'So many welders today have been trained in only one specific welding process for one 
job application. They are partially trained.· This is a problem for us smaller companies, 
for we need the all-round welder who is capable of doing our high quality pressure 
welding' (Cited in Kraak, 1988: 149) 
To substantiate this point further Kraak mentions the fact that when ICAL (an engineering 
firm in South Africa) advertised in newspapers at the beginning of 1986 for qualified welders, 
only 12 passed ICAL's stringent entry tests, although 560 had applied. In the opinion of the 
ICAL training officer whom Kraak interviewed, this low pass rate was 'surely a good measure 
of the extent of the quality and deficiency we face today'.(Cited in Kraak, 1988: 149) 
This evidence reveals enormous subtleties, which can partially be explained by drawing on 
literature which discusses the industrial organisation of modem firms . Groover identifies three 
distinct types of production organisation that will greatly influence the structure of the labour 
force in the plant as well as the training regimes that can be implemented with firm-based 
training (Groover, 1987). These types of production organisation are general to the 
manufacturing sector of all industrial economies. The first of these he refers to as job-shop 
production. It is characterised by low volume but flexible outputs. The work-force is 
characterised by a relatively high level of skill in order to undertake a range of different work 
assignments. Examples of products produced using such a type of production organisation 
are: space-vehicles, aircraft and machine-tools. 
The second type of production organisation is known as batch production. Batch production 
makes use of general purpose manufacturing equipment. Batch production plants include 
91 
machine shops, casting foundries, plastic moulding factories and pressworking shops. Under 
this manufacturing regime skill requirements are generally less specialised and more 
generalised. After initial induction and training, tasks can be performed by labour drawn from 
a broader segment of competent job applicants. 
The third type of production organisation is referred to as mass production or continuous flow 
processes and is characterised by the manufacture of identical products. Since there is a high 
demand for the product (e.g. light-bulbs or beer) the rate of production is very high. 'Not only 
is the equipment dedicated to one product, but the entire plant is often designed for the 
exclusive purpose of producing the particular product. The equipment is special purpose 
rather than general purpose. The investment in machines and specialized tooling is high. In a 
sense, the production skill has been transferred from the operator to the machine. 
Consequently, the skill level oflabour in a mass production plant tends to be lower than in a 
batch plant or job shop' (Groover, 1987: 19-20). It is quite obvious too, that skilled labour 
will merely be engaged in routine functions such as plant maintenance. 
The significance of the three types of production organisation has a direct bearing on the 
evidence assembled thus far. It suggests that a very significant correlation exists between the 
production organisation of firms and the type of industrial apprenticeship training regimes that 
these firms are able to implement. Firms engaged in job shop production which draw on a 
large number of specialised occupations are more likely to train selected segments of its labour 
force in the acquisition of skills in some of these specialised occupations than for instance 
firms whose production organisation is not dependent on such specialised labour. There is a 
stronger liklihood for artisan trades and occupations to be found in firms whose production 
organisation is characterised by job-shop production than in firms which either have batch 
production or mass production as an organisational characteristic. A similar characterisation 
will separate batch production firms from mass production firms . It is very unlikely for firms 
engaged exclusively in mass production activities to have the capacity to train its apprentices 
in trades such as welding or fitting and turning when these are only its maintenance and not its 
core activities, as will be the norm for mass production firms. This is particularly the case, 
when the conventional standards demanded are most likely to be set by firms (i.e. job 
production firms) whose central activities, welding and fitting and turning might be. 
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Differences in firm sizes as was noted in table 15 are closely related to differences in the 
production organisation of these firms. It is more likely that firms in the Basic Iron and Steel 
and the Basic Non-Ferrous Metal Industry will have a greater inclination towards mass 
production or continuous flow processes of production. Firms located in the Fabricated Metal 
Products industry, the Machinery industry and the Electrical Machinery industry will bear a 
closer resemblance to batch production processes and perhaps in certain cases to the job-shop 
production where low volume flexible outputs are not unusual. Ultimately, these differences 
in the structure and organisation of the production systems in firms exerts a dramatic influence 
on the type of training that each firm is able to provide to its workforce, especially those 
undergoing apprenticeship training. 
Although there is no hard empirical evidence to illustrate the point, a strong argument can be 
advanced for the following conclusion: this is that the size of firms, the type of industrial 
organisation and production systems in these firms coupled with their sectoral location in the 
metal sector influences the type of training apprentices obtain in such firms. These effects will 
resonate in the outcome of trade test results, and although a categorically direct 
correspondence between the structural milieu that has been discussed and trade tests is not 
being argued for, there is indeed a very strong correlation between them. It is surprising that 
the HSRC/NTB Investigation into the Training of Artisans did not discuss this theme at all. 
4.4 Testing Procedures 
A large segment of non-academic literature produced mainly by industry linked evaluators of 
artisan training programmes has been critical of the theoretical orientation pervading artisan 
training in South Africa. This literature is critical of the way success at examinations is 
generally perceived as a test of competence. This disjuncture between theory and practice has 
been further entrenched through the system of trade testing which evolved in South Africa. 
This means that practical competences which existed outside the boundaries of assessment 
were not considered in formal testing procedures. An article discussing the shortcomings in 
the training and selection of apprentices aptly highlights this dilemma: 
'For the skilled worker, technical knowledge and practical ability are supplementary. 
The courses and syllabi provided by theory schooling of apprentices seldom correlate 
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in a meaningful way with their practical work. The seeming irrelevancy of the theory 
courses is an important reason why very many apprentices perform poorly in their 
theory studies. '(Van Gass, 1972: 34) 
A large component of apprenticeship programmes were designed to give its recipients training 
in manual occupations. In my assessment, many of these students had become alienated from 
the academic orientation of schooling and in many instances showed greater inclination to 
manual and practical training. Consequently, it appears that the very selection criteria which 
had been used to expel students from the academic stream, have also been used to assess how 
successful they were in manual and practical fields. It is contradictory because the illusion is 
created that pupils who were unsuccessful in academic streams in secondary education would 
be accommodated in manual and practical fields which would presumably have required 
different modes of assessment to those which redirected them away from the academic to the 
non-academic streams. A contributor to the magazine People and Profits recognised this 
clearly in 1974 when he wrote: 
'There is no provision for the boy who fails every exam, but is marvellous in practice. 
This is illogical. The essence of trades is that they are manual occupations. And one 
of the results of the whole examination syndrome is that too few apprentices come 
from ordinary high schools - the technical school boys are put off by the thought of 
exams. We certainly do need some form of recognition of ability, but this must go far 
deeper than a mere mark in an irrelevant exam'(Beckett, 1974: 12). 
Perhaps, it is no wonder that an American visitor to South Africa once remarked that: 'South 
Africa seems to be an examination-ridden state'{Spencer, 1937: 43). 
It was this extremely uncritical attitude and veneration of examinations that allowed judgement 
to be levelled against the significantly low trade-test pass rate of apprentices to artisan 
occupations. This was the main motivation for the introduction of modularised testing. Pass 
rates were used as a criterion to assess the efficiency and success of the apprenticeship system 
in South Africa. Because the pass rate for trade tests were only modest at best, the broad 
sentiment from trade test evaluators and employers was that the system of apprenticeship 
training necessarily was deficient and in need of complete replacement. 
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However, as Steyn ( 1980) showed, a number of design criteria influenced the operation of 
trade tests which were performed by COTT. A tension was created between assessing 
incumbents for competence on the one hand and grading for results on the other. Tests for 
competence would be concerned with measuring competence, despite the results it reflected. 
A different judgement would prevail where tests were concerned with showing particular 
results. At the margins of success or failure, a test for results could either: mask incompetence 
or prejudice competence. A test for results would therefore use criteria which shifts from one 
test event to the other, criteria which carry a subjective orientation. This is confirmed by 
Steyn who maintains: 
'During its original design, the trade test standards were manipulated until the results 
approximated a normal or chance distribution. This was obtained in 1957. Since then, 
the test design for the various trades was left to develop largely uncontrolled with 
regard to normalisation' .(Steyn, 1980: 75). 
Steyn (1980) concluded that since no uniform approach existed between the criterion-
referenced one which measured mastery and the purely norm-referenced one which graded 
apprentices, it actually meant that in the absence of a standard approach to trade testing, each 
of the test makers was defending their own design. Since COTT performed the periodic 
testing of tradesmen, it institutionalised and perpetuated these limitations. Even the 
HSRC/NTB Investigation into the Training of Artisans, adopted an uncritical attitude to the 
standard of testing undertaken by COTT. Standards specified in COTT examinations were 
accepted as a given and not subjected to any critical appraisal or evaluation in the report. 
Steyn argued that this problem manifested itself especially in the mining industry where the 
relationship between trade test results and on-the-job competence, particularly for fitters, was 
weak. Trade tests merely measured manufacturing ability whereas at least four-fifths of fitters 
in the mining industry were engaged in maintenance and repair tasks. Therefore trade tests 
results of fitter trades in the mining industry were actually a useless and misleading measure of 
potential on-the-job competence.(Steyn, 1980: 76) But the theory and principles of 
manufacturing ability were being measured and assessed in trade tests. So naturally, trade test 
pass rates in the mining industry were low. This is precisely what I have tried to show in 
section 4.2: that there is a very strong influence by the size and organisation of enterprises on 
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the trade test pass rates of apprentices. Exactly the same corrollary can be made when 
comparing different industries within a broader sector, as I have tried to illustrate in my 
discussion of the evidence in table 15 . 
In addition, if Steyn' s evidence is correct, a large segment of trade test examination failures 
might have been severely penalised and prejudiced merely because the examining authorities 
(COTT) were intent on achieving a normal statistical distribution in the ratio of passes to 
failures. The low trade test pass rate in artisan training overall was used as a criterion to shift 
from a singular examination oriented trade test to one where continuous competency-based 
assessment would be the accepted mode of assessment. 
In submissions made to the HSRC/NTB Investigation into the Training of Artisans, neither 
employers nor trade test officers were able to coherently identify the source of the problem 
which contributed to trade test failures . Each tended to advance monocausal explanations for 
this state of affairs. The test officers at COTT blamed the poor practical training of 
apprentices for failure at trade tests. 
'It appears that inadequacies or shortcomings in practical training as well as the 
prescribed training schedules and training programmes which do not correspond with 
the schedules, are seen as the main reason for failure by trade testees. From interviews 
and other feedback it also seems that the relatively low literacy level of some testees 
contributes to the fact that they do not understand test instructions and/or cannot grasp 
plans and drawings. All evidence obtained indicates that better results can be expected 
from well-structured training programmes. ' (HSRC/NTB, 1985: 140) 
Employers in tum blam~d communication problems as the major source of trade test failures. 
' Communication problems sometimes occur between testees and test officers. The 
result is that testees are not always certain of exactly what is expected of them. 
According to the testees and some of their employers, the test questions are at times 
not clearly set and formulated .' (HSRCINTB, 1985 : 134-135) 
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The purpose of this chapter has been to debunk such singular and monocausal explanations for 
low trade test passes. While it can be seen that successful firm-based training is dependent on 
a host of factors, some of which have been discussed thus far, the design of trade tests 
themselves might also have contributed to the relatively low trade test pass rates. 
Consequently, one is given greater insight into the reasons for the disappointing trade test 
success rate in South Africa. The gradual introduction of institutionally based technical 
instruction in unison with the practical gathering of experience in industry as intended by the 
new promulgations contained in the Manpower Training Act is likely to have a positive impact 
on the success of artisans undergoing trade testing. But that can only be verified with the 
passage of time. Hopefully, later studies will shed more light on these phenomena. 
4.5 Conclusion 
How do artisan trade test results serve as an indicator of the erosion of apprenticeship 
training? 
Taken on their own terms, trade test results actually reveal very little and are therefore a poor 
indication of the erosion of apprenticeship training. However, because trade test results in the 
metal and engineering industry have been consistently low, and prior to 1989, as is shown in 
table 11, these have been below 50%, it provides strong circumstantial evidence that either the 
pass rates or the testing procedures are a source of problems. If the pass rates are the source 
of the problem, it means that apprentices taking the trade test exams are ill-prepared for it. If 
the testing procedures are the source of the problem, it means that the standard of testing is 
too high. On the other hand, had trade test results been relatively high, it would also have 
provided strong circumstantial evidence about the reasonably good nature of artisan testing 
procedures. The only valid criticism that might have been levelled against relatively high trade 
test results would have been that the standards of assessment were unnecessarily low. The 
insufficient nature of the data on trade test results does not make it possible to move beyond 
either of the two assessments elaborated above. However, the fact that adequate reasons for 
this phenomenon were not advanced earlier was symptomatic of the institutional inertia in the 
regulation and management of apprenticeship training in South Africa. A commission of 
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inquiry into apprenticeship training was constituted only in the 1980s when the apprenticeship 
training system was already in deep crisis. 
This chapter has argued that trade test results hide much more than they actually reveal. The 
data on trade test results do not show to what extent artisan training is affected by the size and 
organisation of enterprises. An assessment of the data on trade test results needs to be 
contextualised within a more detailed understanding of the nature of enterprises within which 
apprenticeship training occurs. Once this is achieved, it becomes more plausible to make 
stronger judgements concerning the erosion of apprenticeship training. Consequently, it is 
hard to understand how it was ever possible to use the low trade test pass rate as numerous 
commentators do (examples being Hutt (1964) and HSRC/NTB (1985). Meth (1979) is an 
exception) as a reason to declare that the artisan training system was in need of reform. The 
reason why I argue this point, is that the statistics on artisan trade test results do not constitute 
sufficient evidence to make such a point. It appears to be merely a gesture at pretending to be 
informed. 
Within the context of an understanding of the size and organisation of enterprises in the metal 
and engineering industries, as well as an understanding of the problems experienced with the 
testing procedures for artisans, one can declare more positively that artisan trade test results in 
the metal and engineering industry for the period 1969 to 1992 did indeed serve as an 
indicator of the erosion of apprenticeship training. The nature of trade test results were an 
accompaniment to the crisis in apprenticeship training, which during the decades of the 'sixties 
and 'seventies had undergone systematic erosion. The fact that the institutional response to 
the nature of artisan trade test results was insignificant until the mid-eighties, demonstrates 
that the institutional regulation of apprenticeship training in South Africa was itself in turmoil. 
This institutional inertia mirrored the actual erosion of apprenticeship training at the 
workplace. It represented a crisis in the ability of the institutions of the state, empowered with 
the responsibility of human resources development, to govern effectively. That is the central 
point which this chapter makes. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND TENTATIVE REMARKS ON 
REVERSING THE EROSION OF APPRENTICESHIP TRAINING 
5.1 Summary 
This thesis has explored the evidence and processes which have led to the decline and 
transmutation of the apprenticeship system in South Africa, particularly as it has been 
experienced in the metal and engineering industry. It has attempted to analyse the forces at 
the workplace and at a broader institutional level which have contributed to the erosion of 
apprenticeship training. 
At the workplace, employers used claims of a skills shortage to redefine the boundaries of skill 
in artisan occupations. An intense contestation between employers and artisans occurred on 
this issue. These contestations were over the definition of skill. Its focal points were job 
fragmentation and job dilution, which often camouflaged the economic motives of the 
contestation - that is, a contestation about the price of skilled labour. An outcome of the 
process of job fragmentation and job dilution was the substantial and unhindered growth 
recorded in the ranks of semi-skilled employees. Yet as was shown in chapter one, the 
trajectory in the development of apprenticeship systems is not unilinear and one-dimensional. 
Although the path followed by the apprenticeship system in South Africa was closely 
influenced by the direction along which the apprenticeship system in Britain developed, it was 
unique in several ways. The political milieu, as well as the political and economic institutions 
were very different. The architects of the apprenticeship system were also aware of the 
strengths of comparative apprenticeship systems, especially that of Germany, which they tried 
to draw upon. These influences were captured particularly in Commissions oflnquiry (Union 
of South Africa, 193 5; Union of South Africa, 1948) and influenced the organisation of the 
apprenticeship system. This occurred in particular within the Central Organisation of 
Technical Training (COTT) and remained pervasive at the National Training Board for 
instance, even into the late 1980s. In so far as the conflict over the definition of skill between 
employers and labour and the setting of the price of skilled labour was concerned, the 
apprenticeship system in South Africa and the practices with which it was preoccupied was 
akin to that which prevailed in Britain. 
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Institutionally, the basis of apprenticeship training in South Africa historically was flawed, 
because it codified and entrenched racial segregation in employment and training. This created 
serious contradictions and gave the protective and gate-keeping role of the apprenticeship 
system an overt racial discriminatory character. It precluded the development of tactical 
alliances between organised white artisan unions and emerging black progressive trade unions 
to preserve the apprenticeship system from its systematic erosion, particularly in relation to its 
strong firm-based components. 
In addition to these institutional weaknesses, the regulation of apprenticeship training in the 
metal and engineering trades, as was shown in chapter two, was inefficient and unwieldly. The 
absence of compulsory trade testing and .the notion of 'eflluxion through time', captures the 
institutional weakness of the apprenticeship system. The empirical indicators which were 
highlighted in chapter 3, demonstrates the extent of the erosion of apprenticeship training. 
Since this is a record of events in the sector which trains the largest number of apprentices 
(altogether one-third of all apprentices in manufacturing activities) it is a highly representative 
case of trends within the apprenticeship training syst~m. It has to be noted that the erosion of 
apprenticeship training has not been an even process. Even within the metal and engineering 
industry, old hierachies within particular job categories and job fields of artisan employment 
have remained intact; and the racially exclusive character of past employment practices is 
highly evident. On the other hand, job categories and job fields within artisan employment 
which require less specialised competencies, such as welding for example, have witnessed a 
noticeable influx and increase in black artisan employment as well as black apprentice 
recruitment. 
As was shown in chapter four, the size and industrial organisation of enterprises had a 
negative influence on the effectiveness of the apprenticeship system. Even the testing 
procedures for apprentices who were on the brink of qualifying as artisans had severe 
limitations as was illustrated in chapter four. In addition, an institutional inertia resulted in 
limited and ad hoc responses to the symptoms of crisis in apprenticeship training, such as low 
trade test results. This institutional inertia mirrored the actual erosion of apprenticeship 
training at the workplace. The fact that such a crisis was being experienced suggests that the 
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crisis was symptomatic of the inability of the institutions of the state during the apartheid era, 
empowered with the responsibility of human resources development, to govern effectively. 
5.2 The Tension between Inclusion and Exclusion 
If the apprenticeship training system in South Africa is still considered as an important training 
arena, as most government publications on the subject declare, and if it is attributed with a 
strong role in the industrial skills training arena, then there is a logical need for the erosion of 
apprenticeship training in South Africa to be radically addressed. This has however not 
occurred as the previous chapters have attempted to. show. 
Though the apprenticeship system in South Africa catered historically for a racially exclusive 
segment of the population, it is being gradually changed, especially in industries where the 
ability to transfer skills can be accomplished in a shorter duration, such as the building 
industry.19 The converse of this however, is that entry standards for acceptance to 
apprenticeship programmes have been systematically stiffened to the extent that the invisible 
portals of job reservation, especially in the more skilled trades, continue to thrive, as has been 
the case in the past. 20 The problem of inclusion and exclusion therefore remains severe. 
Currently, most apprenticeship programmes do not cater for individuals in need of them most, 
since selection criteria excludes them from its ambit altogether. 
5.3 Raising the Hurdles 
Previously entry requirements were ignored or overridden for white apprentices, particularly in 
parastatal enterprises and government and municipal institutions where, as part of ' civilised' 
labour policies, job reservation was rigorously enforced. The process was strenuously 
guarded by the white artisan unions who served as watch dogs on apprenticeship committees 
and persistently vetoed any exemptions to the Apprenticeship Act which would have given 
black trainees permission to be trained in jobs which were perceived to fall within artisan 
trades. This capacity and commitment enabled the white artisan unions to protect and defend 
19 Of course a more detailed analysis is required to examine the forces which shape such phenomena. 
20 For a more detailed examination ofthis trend see Lundall and Kimmie (1992) and Mohamed and Kimmie 
(1992). 
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the interests of their privileged constituency but also enabled the apprenticeship system to 
resist the structural erosion it was experiencing, for a rriuch longer period. The decline of the 
predominantly white and often racially exclusive artisan unions coupled with the weakness of 
the emerging independent progressive trade unions to represent an artisan constituency led to 
the gradual decline and eventual weakening of the system of apprenticeship training then 
prevalent in South Africa. These forces were discussed in detail in chapters two and three. 
Not only did the apprenticeship system become gradually divorced from its constituency, as a 
result of changes in workplace organisation and trade union representation, the constituency, 
in terms of educational attainment, that had formerly fallen under the umbrella of 
apprenticeship training was systematically denied access to it. This was brought about by the 
periodic increase in educational requirements which were laid down as a standard of entry. 
For example, in 1983 Ike van der Walt, president at the time of the South African 
Boilermakers Society charged industry of denying Africans access to training skills. Van der 
Walt claimed that the entry standards for apprenticeships being demanded by employers was 
unnecessarily high and indicated that the 'trend towards high entry qualifications, combined 
with a reduced period of apprenticeship, was ·preventing large numbers of young people who 
would, given time, qualify as competent artisans, from doing so' (Rand Daily Mail 17/8/1983). 
These covert practices by employers served to reproduce and continue the discriminatory 
relations that formal job reservation in South Africa was tailored to entrench 
Gate-keeping mechanisms, such as qualification requirements for jobs, denied a host of 
work-seekers with little other alternative of obtaining skills training, access to technical 
competence along craft lines. Not only were such individuals ejected from the school system 
on academic grounds, they were now excluded from receiving manual and technical 
instruction on similar grounds. Because of the general underdevelopment of African 
education, this situation was more onerous for this segment of potential apprentices, since they 
are generally required to possess a matric certificate with mathematics and physics before they 
are accepted into apprenticeship programmes. This convention was the norm, particularly in 
the engineering and related industries, whereas the prevailing entry requirement after 1985 was 
a standard eight certificate with mathematics and physics. 
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Table 16 gives an educational profile of work-seekers on the labour market in South Africa. 
The proportion of individuals with a standard seven and lower educational level and who are 
most in need of skill training programmes, account for 65 .5% of male and 50.0% of female 
work seekers. 
Table 16: Educational Profile of Work-Seekers on the Labour Market 
Educational Level Male Female 
Under Std.6 21.6% 22.5% 
Std. 6-7 44.0% 27.5% 
Std.8-9 22.4% 27.0% 
Std. 10 10.0% 20.0% 
Higher than Std 10 0.9% 2.0% 
Special School 1.1% 1.0% 
100% 100% 
Source: Department of Manpower, Annual Report 1991. 
Yet, this does not even account for the seriously deficient level of education for those who 
already constitute part of the economically active population. According to a recent National 
Manpower Commission Report, 35.5% of the economically active population have an 
educational qualification of standard four or lower and may therefore be regarded as 
functionally illiterate.(National Manpower Commission, 1993: 45 & 50) How will the training 
needs of this segment of working people whose productive potential is far greater, be 
addressed in the short-term and in the long-term? 
It is usually the case for administrators and policy investigators to accept that higher entry 
standards into apprenticeship programmes guarantees that individuals on such programmes 
will be more successful. Higher entry standards are perceived to be necessary to rectify poor 
standards of performance as represented in trade tests and the productivity and quality of 
output generally. These recommendations are often drawn from very narrow concrete 
conditions and in the past were made in the interests of a racially exclusive political agenda. 
For instance, in its inquiry into labour legislation, the Wiehahn Commission recognised that a 
large proportion of ' coloureds' and Asians were unable to obtain apprenticeship contracts 
because they did not meet the minimum education requirements for admission (Department of 
Manpower Utilisation, 1980, para. 2.12, p.15). However, the Commission cited evidence in 
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its final report in a way suggesting that it tacitly agreed with the gist of rather crass arguments 
made in a submission before it. 
' ... Divergent views were expressed in regard to the minimum educational qualification 
of Standard 7. In general it was felt that the qualification should be raised to Standard 
8 for certain trades. It was alleged that persons who left school with a Standard 6 
certificate were normally irresponsible, lazy or mentally retarded. The main purpose of 
the training scheme was to train persons intensively, theoretically and practically, as 
artisans and the scheme as such was not a rehabilitation scheme. Furthermore, it was 
impossible to train a person adequately in certain trades if he only possessed a 
Standard 6 educational qualification' (Department of Manpower Utilisation, 1980: 
para. 3.23). 
For the Wiehahn Commission there was very little debate about such an arbitrary raising of 
entry requirements for apprenticeship programmes. Naturally the artisan unions with 
representation on the Commission would have favoured such a step. This is because the 
majority of their own constituents had been recipients of a compulsory education and would 
not have been severely affected by such a gradual increase in the minimum entry requirements 
for admission to apprenticeship programmes. In any case such a move was designed to 
discriminate against the educational achievements of those who were outside the system, not 
those who were already inside. And as Kooy (1952) showed already in the 'fifties, 
compulsory early schooling to a specified age was a norm for white children and at least 90% 
reached standard seven (Kooy, 1952: 2). 
For the apprenticeship system to have a broader vocational training objective, it is essential 
that it incorporates a greater number of individuals, who very often eventually pursue careers 
in craft trades and occupations. It is best achieved by extending contracts of apprenticeship to 
a wider segment of potential entrants to apprenticeship programmes. Apprentices who show 
aptitude and commitment will certainly benefit from an extension of their training at technical 
colleges. Apprentices who are disinclined to further their education through classroom based 
instruction will nonetheless benefit from exposure and training in a work based technical and 
manual stream, where they acquire solid manual and craft skills. There is a large segment of 
work-seekers who would certainly benefit from skills training where the testing of incumbents 
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revolves around the demonstration of manual skills acquired. The more manually oriented 
individuals will not necessarily become technicians or rocket engineers, but if incorporated 
into apprenticeship training programmes for a set period, will make an important contribution 
to the economic well being of their country. 
5.4 Recasting Apprenticeship Boundaries 
An analysis of the basic institutional fabric of artisan employment in South Africa reveals that 
the poaching of newly qualified artisans creates enormous financial loses for concerns 
genuinely committed to artisan training (See chapter 2, section 2.5). The prevalence of 
poaching remains a disincentive to firms which have periodically trained apprentices from 
doing so continuously, while it remains an incentive to firms who lack the inclination or 
capacity to train apprentices to continue operating as poachers or as economists refer to them: 
'free-riders'. It is a system essentially geared for self-destruction. For the apprenticeship 
system to become more effective in the training of artisans, the practice of poaching must be 
curbed completely. 
Perhaps the imposition of service contracts, equivalent to the duration of the apprenticeship 
contract should be compulsory for newly qualified artisans. It should apply especially to those 
artisans who have been trained within state (public) enterprises, since these enterprises carry 
an unfair burden utilising public resources for human resource development, but losing it via 
poaching to private beneficiaries. 
Alternatively, it may be necessary to compel enterprises which do indenture apprentices, to 
become members of a training register as in Germany, so that the quality of training supplied 
may be open to scrutiny and greater monitoring. Firms unable to perform satisfactorily would 
be taken off the register and prohibited altogether from training or employing apprentices. 
Consequently, through its record of performance, a firm can develop a reputation as a reliable 
training agent. It will therefore be more likely to attract apprentices with a greater inclination 
to hard work. 
Should firms which do not train apprentices, be denied access to newly qualified artisans, they 
will be compelled to utilise the available sources of artisan labour. The excess demand may 
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even bid up the real actual wages and eventually statutory wages of artisan labour. If this 
occurs, artisan occupations may be more attractive as a career path for young adults, 
especially when the predicted post-apartheid economic upsurge begins to be felt in the 
economy. 
As it was shown in chapter three, the comparatively higher wages of apprentices to that of 
labourers during the 'seventies and 'eighties implied that during the first and second years of 
employment, while their contribution to output was not as significant, apprentices could 
theoretically be substituted by unskilled labour. If this were the only consideration, it would 
have been easy to reach the conclusion that the declining number of apprentices employed in 
the industry was due to the fact that the wages of apprentices was higher than that of unskilled 
labourers. Initially, the statutory minimum wages of apprentices were higher than those of 
labourers but since 1988 as has been shown in chapter three, the wages of first year 
apprentices have been lower than those oflabourers. I have found no empirical evidence 
which shows that the decline in the number of apprentices was caused by the relatively higher 
wages paid to apprentices in relation to labourers prior to 1988. The point that needs 
emphasising though is that the reduction of minimum wages for apprentices, could be a 
greater incentive for employers seriously committed to training artisan labour to employ a 
larger number of apprentices. Combined with the systematic regulation of training 
performance which I have alluded to above, such an arrangement represents a trade-off 
between training, compensation and affordability. Such incentives should have a limited 
duration and should not be perceived as a licence to utilise cheap skilled labour ad infinitum. 
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